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 CONSTITUTIONAL COLORBLINDNESS AND THE FAMILY  
KATIE EYER† 
Family law has escaped the colorblindness revolution. During the same 
time frame that the Supreme Court has adopted increasingly stringent constitutional 
standards for even “benign” uses of race (including, most notably, affirmative 
action), the lower courts have continued to take a loose and permissive approach to 
many government uses of race in the family law context. Thus, courts have 
continued to regularly affirm (and to apply minimal constitutional scrutiny to) the 
use of race to determine foster care and adoptive placements, as well as the use of 
race as a factor in custody disputes between interracial parents. 
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This Article, drawing on heretofore unexplored historical sources, examines the 
Supreme Court’s role in the development of these divergent approaches to the use of 
race in the affirmative action and family law contexts. As those sources demonstrate, 
the Court has—over the last forty years—had numerous opportunities to address the 
growing divide. Nevertheless, the Court (and particularly some of its most ardent 
affirmative action detractors) has historically been reluctant to do so, at least in part 
because of a normative endorsement of the race-based practices at issue in the 
family law context. Thus, the Court has avoided cases involving the use of race in 
family law—and taken other steps to limit the reach of its doctrine in the family 
law arena—based on a perception that remaining uses of race in the family are 
fundamentally different, and at least in some contexts, benign.  
This history has profound implications for the Court’s broader race law juris-
prudence. The Supreme Court has—at least facially—rejected the possibility of a 
role for contextual or normative factors in its application of equal protection 
doctrine to race. Instead, the Court has demanded that race-based classifications—
no matter what their intent or effects—be subjected to strict scrutiny. But the history 
of the Court’s approach to family law strongly suggests that the Court itself does in 
fact weigh such considerations in its approach to taking up and adjudicating race 
law claims. This Article suggests that there are serious process, legitimacy, and 
substantive concerns raised by such a divergence between the Court’s formal 
doctrine and its practice, and discusses alternatives for aligning the two more fully. 
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INTRODUCTION 
By all accounts, the colorblindness revolution has arrived. Since City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,1 Supreme Court majorities have proclaimed the 
Court’s obligation to subject all uses of race to the “most rigid scrutiny.”2 
 
1 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
2 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (quoting Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 
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Thus, the Court’s ostensible command has been that even programs intended 
to benefit minority group members—such as affirmative action—must be 
subjected to the same constitutional regime as undoubtedly invidious uses 
of race. Undergirding this approach have been empirical and moral claims of 
the necessity of consistency in treating all uses of race as inherently sus-
pect.3 Scholars have reinforced this account, contending that the Supreme 
Court has fundamentally turned away from a contextually variable approach 
to race to one in which all uses of race are treated as presumptively malign.4 
But the colorblindness revolution’s reported rise has been at least par-
tially apocryphal. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the courts do not 
strictly scrutinize all government uses of race. Indeed, colorblindness 
doctrine has—despite its sweeping rhetoric—failed to reach a wide array of 
racial domains.5 As a result, many putatively benign government uses of 
 
(2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1989) (plurality 
opinion); id., 488 U.S. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
3 See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2418; id., 133 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring); Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 721, 745-48 (2007); id., 551 
U.S. at 751-52, 758, 778-82 (Thomas, J., concurring); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, 229, 236; id., 515 
U.S. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993); Croson, 488 U.S. 
at 493-94; id., 488 U.S. at 521, 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
4 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Color-
blindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 985 (2007); Reginald Oh, Discrimination and Distrust: A Critical 
Linguistic Analysis of the Discrimination Concept, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 837, 861 (2005); see also 
Ariela J. Gross, From the Streets to the Courts: Doing Grassroots Legal History of the Civil Rights Era, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1233, 1250-51 (2012) (reviewing TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO 
DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2010)). 
But cf. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 25-28 (2003) (arguing that, in reality, assessments of 
what will count as a “classification” in equal protection doctrine are informed by other widely 
shared normative values); R. Richard Banks, The Benign–Invidious Asymmetry in Equal Protection 
Analysis, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 573, 574-75 (2003) (arguing that “[e]ven seemingly stalwart 
defenders of a symmetrical nondiscrimination mandate may, in practice, support the very sort of 
asymmetry they purport to oppose”).  
5 The acontextual colorblindness doctrine developed in the Court’s affirmative action cases 
has been extended only to a limited number of contexts outside of affirmative action, most notably 
to race-based primary school assignments and to race-based redistricting. See PICS, 551 U.S. at 
720; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904-05 (1995). But cf. infra note 289 and accompanying text 
(noting that the Court has not always applied the same gatekeeping standards even in those 
contexts to which it has purportedly extended its affirmative action precedents). There are many 
other areas to which colorblindness doctrine has not been extended robustly, including family law, 
non-racially classifying but race-intentional government programs, recordkeeping, race-based 
suspect selection, and others. See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 4, at 16-18 (describing other contexts 
in which the courts have declined to extend strict scrutiny, including the census and race-based 
suspect descriptions); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 939-940 (2006) [hereinafter Balkin & Siegel, Principles] (listing racial data 
collection and recordkeeping); Banks, supra note 4, at 579 (noting that lower courts have declined 
to apply strict scrutiny to race-intentional but not racially classifying government actions); R. 
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race have continued to be ubiquitous—and largely constitutionally unchal-
lenged—long past the announcement of the Court’s stringent and ostensibly 
global approach to contemporary uses of race. And, while the partialness of 
the colorblindness revolution is perhaps most vividly apparent in the lower 
courts, it has been far from restricted to that context. Thus, the Supreme 
Court itself has—through docket management and more direct means—
declined to fully embrace the implications of its colorblindness revolution.6 
This Article tells the story of one of the most persistent and striking 
contexts in which the “colorblindness revolution” has been more illusory 
than real: the use of race in family law.7 Beginning with the aftermath of 
Loving v. Virginia,8 a decision often canonized as the endpoint of race-based 
family law rules,9 it traces the courts’ generally permissive response to 
remaining official uses of race in the family during the following half 
 
Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 (2001) [hereinafter Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection] (providing an 
extended treatment of race-based suspect selection); R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: 
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 YALE L.J. 875, 
904-08 (1998) [hereinafter Banks, Color of Desire] (same, listing legislative districting, criminal 
profiles, adoption, and recordkeeping); R. Richard Banks, The Illusion of Colorblindness in 
Antidiscrimination Law (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Banks, 
Colorblindness] (listing race-based suspect profiles, facilitative accommodation in adoption, and 
racial casting); infra Parts I–V (detailing the courts’ constitutionally permissive approach to 
contemporary uses of race in family law).  
6 Supra note 5; see also Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (denying certiorari in a case exempting race-based suspect selection 
from equal protection scrutiny); Brown v. City of Oneanta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001) (same).  
7 In the interest of space, there is one major omission from my discussion of this subject. 
Specifically, with the exception of the case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013), I 
have not taken up the distinct constitutional issues presented by the use of race or heritage in 
family law determinations involving Native American children, or the statutory scheme that 
governs such uses, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The constitutional issues presented in 
this context are analytically distinct in light of the Court’s historic treatment of classifications 
based on Indian status as political, rather than racial. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552-53 
(1973). Thus, while there are both political and legal interrelationships between the historical 
approach to custody and adoptive placement of Native American children and the approach taken 
vis-à-vis other minority children, a full discussion of this issue exceeds the scope of this Article. 
See RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES 480-518 (2003) (addressing this issue 
separately for similar reasons).  
Leaving aside the Native American context, the majority of the discourse and practice around 
the contemporary use of race in the family law context has focused on black or black-biracial 
children. Thus, while I do not exclude from my discussion cases dealing with other minority 
children (or, on rare occasions, Caucasian children), my discussion is most salient to and typified 
by agency and judicial practice vis-à-vis black and black-biracial children. 
8 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
9 Mark Rahdert, Transracial Adoption—A Constitutional Perspective, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1687, 
1690 (1995). 
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century. As this exploration reveals, the use of race in the family has 
remained robust in the post-Loving era, with many state agencies and courts 
continuing to apply race-based rules in the adoption, foster care, and 
custody contexts.10 Constitutional challenges to these race-based actions have 
generally fared poorly, with courts typically (albeit not always) applying de 
minimis constitutional scrutiny. Thus, during the same time frame that the 
Supreme Court has increasingly proclaimed the need to strictly scrutinize 
all government uses of race, family law has remained a bastion of racial 
permissiveness. 
This divergence has—unsurprisingly—not gone unremarked in the legal 
literature. Indeed, a number of scholars have argued for the erroneousness 
of the lower courts’ approach to contemporary uses of race in family law (or 
the unconstitutionality of such racial policies themselves), contending that 
the Court’s contemporary affirmative action jurisprudence demands the 
application of strict scrutiny, and that this high bar is one that contemporary 
uses of race in the family are unable to meet.11 According to these scholars, 
the lower courts’ approach to the use of race in the family has fundamentally 
diverged from the Supreme Court’s race law jurisprudence and should be 
brought in line with contemporary affirmative action jurisprudence. Thus, 
the story that has been told by contemporary scholars is primarily one of 
lower court disobedience—one in which the lower courts have failed to act 
as faithful implementers of the Supreme Court’s colorblindness revolu-
tion—and not one which calls into question the dominant narrative of the 
Court’s own jurisprudence. 
But there is a profoundly different story to be told regarding the contem-
porary history of race in family law. As archival Supreme Court documents 
reveal, far from diverging from the Supreme Court’s intended approach to 
the use of race in family law, it appears that the Court itself—and particularly 
 
10 While Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984), struck down one particular use of race in 
child custody in the mid-1980s (i.e., the practice of removing custody based on a parent’s 
interracial marriage), it did little to disrupt continuing uses of race outside of that specific context, 
including uses of race in adoption, foster care, and interracial parent custody disputes. See infra 
Parts II–III. 
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching 
in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991); David Meyer, Lecture, Palmore Comes of Age: The 
Place of Race in the Placement of Children, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 183, 185-87 (2007); 
Davidson Pattiz, Racial Preference in Adoption: An Equal Protection Challenge, 82 GEO. L.J. 2571 
(1994); David Rottenstein, Trans-Racial Adoption and the Statutory Preference Schemes: Before the 
“Best Interests” and After the “Melting Pot,” 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 137 (1994). For a divergent 
perspective, see Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and 
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 33 (1993–1994). 
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its race conservatives12—have deliberately shielded continued uses of race in 
the family law context from rigorous constitutional scrutiny. Thus, although 
the Court in Palmore v. Sidoti did take up one contemporary instantiation of 
the use of race in family law (the practice of depriving a parent of custody 
based on a post-divorce interracial marriage), it acted carefully in crafting 
its opinion to ensure that it would not inhibit other continuing uses of race 
in the family (including especially adoption).13 And when the lower courts, 
in response, read Palmore narrowly and continued to decline to apply strict 
scrutiny review, the Court repeatedly declined invitations to revisit the 
balance struck in Palmore, based at least in part on the Court’s race con-
servatives’ perception that the remaining uses of race in family law were 
simply “different” and, at least in some circumstances, “benign.”14 
Nor was the tension between the Court’s affirmative action jurispru-
dence and the lower courts’ permissive approach to race in family law 
simply lost on the Justices during this time. Since the very beginning of the 
Court’s modern foray into the affirmative action context, parallels between 
affirmative action and contemporary uses of race in the family law context—
 
12 This Article uses the terms “race conservatives,” “race moderates,” and “race liberals” as a 
shorthand for the array of positions that have been taken by the Justices in the affirmative action 
context vis-à-vis the appropriateness of considering contextual factors (such as whether a 
particular use of race is “benign”) in determining whether strict scrutiny applies. Although there 
are other axes on which one might divide the Justices into categories, for the purposes of this 
Article, endorsement of full strict scrutiny review (without consideration of normative or other 
contextual factors) was selected as the most pertinent divide. Thus, Justices who, during the 
historical time period at issue, clearly expressed (internally or externally) the view that full strict 
scrutiny should be applied even to putatively benign uses of race, such as affirmative action, are 
characterized as “race conservatives.” Those who expressed the view that a more flexible or relaxed 
regime should apply are characterized as “race liberals.” And those who were either inconsistent (at 
that time) or who were ambiguous as to their position are characterized as “race moderates.” I 
borrow this helpful trichotomy (with a number of modifications) from Reva Siegel’s work but 
recognize that these shorthand terms may oversimplify the range of positions that the Justices 
have taken vis-à-vis these issues over time. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkaniza-
tion: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282 (2011) 
[hereinafter Siegel, Antibalkanization]. 
13 See infra Part II. 
14 See infra Parts III–IV. The Court has declined to take up challenges to race-based family 
law practices in a number of cases. See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); Gambla v. Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006), cert. denied, 
552 U.S. 810 (2007); Wilson v. Darrow (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990); In re 
Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 
809 (1995); In re Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992); 
Carlson v. County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 
1023 (1989); see also Memorandum from J.B., Law Clerk, on No. 90-123-CX, Wilson v. Darrow, to 
the Cert Pool 3-4 (Aug. 10, 1990) (on file with Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, 
The Digitial Archive of the Papers of Justice Harry A. Blackmun (2007), http://epstein.usc.edu/ 
research/BlackmunArchive.html [hereinafter Blackmun Digital Archive]). 
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their characterization as benign, their putative benefits for minority15 group 
members—were repeatedly called to the Court’s attention. Thus, both 
litigants and the Justices’ own law clerks have repeatedly highlighted for the 
Justices the doctrinal and logical overlaps between race-based family law 
adjudication and affirmative action jurisprudence. And, indeed, even where 
others have not explicitly pointed out such overlaps, the Justices themselves 
have done so sua sponte, identifying doctrinal overlaps between affirmative 
action and family law in their internal communications. 
Unearthing this rich history has a number of important implications.16 
Most significantly, exploring the constitutional history of race-based family 
law rules at the Supreme Court level exposes the ways in which the Court 
has—sub rosa—profoundly diverged from its claimed colorblindness 
project. Thus, the Court has claimed to reject the possibility that particular 
uses of race might be exempted from stringent constitutional scrutiny—on 
the reasoning that uses of race by the government are inherently malign—
while simultaneously taking a deferential approach to other (non-affirmative 
action) uses of race.17 Indeed, it appears that certain family law uses of race—
including particularly race-matching in adoption—have been deliberately 
shielded from strict scrutiny based on the perception that they are funda-
mentally “different” and—unlike affirmative action—potentially benign. 
Thus, while the Court has facially claimed to adhere to a rule rejecting the 
 
15 Most (but not all) of the cases described herein arose in the context of family law decision-
making vis-à-vis black or black-biracial children. See supra note 7. Thus, although I use the global 
term “minority” to include the limited case law that has arisen outside of that context (and outside 
of the Native American context, omitted from full discussion herein), the majority of cases 
described herein involved black or black-biracial children, a factor that may have been salient to 
the courts’ decisionmaking. Cf. infra note 260 (discussing the historical tendency to essentialize 
individuals with relatively minimal Native American heritage as white, while essentializing those 
with any African American heritage as black). 
16 One important implication, which I do not discuss here, is that this history further sub-
stantiates the robust scholarly consensus that family law is often treated as “exceptional,” and thus 
not subject to normal doctrinal rules, by the courts. See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY 
LAW REIMAGINED: RECASTING THE CANON (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 3) (on file 
with author) (describing family law exceptionalism as the “premise that family law rejects what the 
law otherwise does, and does what the law otherwise rejects”). See generally Janet Halley & Kerry 
Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family 
Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2010) (introduction to a special journal issue 
dedicated to Family Law Exceptionalism). Indeed, it appears that civil rights is a robust area for 
family law exceptionalism, with civil rights doctrines often being disregarded—or only partially 
incorporated—in the family law context. This Article is a part of a broader project investigating 
the manifestations and causes of family law exceptionalism in the civil rights context, other 
portions of which aim to more fully situate civil rights family law exceptionalism within the 
broader family law exceptionalism literature.  
17 See infra Part VI. 
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salience of contextual factors in determining the level of constitutional 
scrutiny to be applied, it has, in practice, looked precisely to such factors as 
a basis for exempting particular uses of race from rigorous constitutional 
review.  
This discordance between the Court’s articulated standard for constitu-
tional race adjudication and its actual approach raises profound concerns. 
Among other things, by formally denying the salience of racial classifica-
tions’ contextual underpinnings (while attending to them sub rosa), the 
Court has deprived litigants of the opportunity to influence its choice of 
how contextual factors matter, and thus to influence its ultimate determina-
tion of whether and where to rigorously enforce stringent standards of 
constitutional review. Moreover, such an undercover approach—by necessity 
unguided by fixed legal standards—must necessarily rest on precisely the 
type of intuitive, instinctive judgments about race (and about which uses of 
race have value) that troublingly echo America’s recent constitutional past. 
Finally, the Court’s formal adoption of a rule that does not accurately reflect 
its true decisionmaking criteria can only lead to distortions in its substan-
tive doctrine, insofar as the Court will find it increasingly difficult to avoid 
the more radical implications of its own pronouncements. 
The modern history of race in family law thus calls for a reevaluation of 
the absence of an explicit place for contextual and normative considerations 
in contemporary race law jurisprudence.18 If, indeed, the Court is engaging 
sub silentio in the practice of shielding certain racial practices from rigorous 
constitutional scrutiny based on context-specific concerns, there are strong 
reasons why the process by which the Court does so should be unobscured 
and made a part of the formal framework of equal protection doctrine.19 
While it is not clear that such formal recognition of contextual variability 
would result in a reversal of the Court’s affirmative action doctrine at this 
juncture (and, indeed, the Court might well adhere to its view that all 
affirmative action programs must uniformly be strictly scrutinized), the 
benefits of such doctrinal “truth in advertising” would nevertheless (for all 
the reasons adverted to above) be profound. Thus, the history of race in 
family law strongly suggests that the time has come to reconsider the 
Court’s decades-old rejection of the notion that normative and contextual 
considerations matter to race law adjudication. 
 
18 Cf. Banks, supra note 4, at 574 (discussing the formal absence of a “Benign–Invidious 
Asymmetry” in equal protection doctrine and suggesting that courts in fact deploy common sense 
intuitions about what uses of race are benign, despite their formal rejection of such an approach). 
19 See infra Part VI. 
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This Article takes up the foregoing issues as follows: Part I (1967–1978) 
traces the constitutional treatment of race-based family law practices during 
the immediate post-Loving era and explores the initial emergence of a divide 
in the Court’s approach to uses of race in the affirmative action and family 
law contexts. Part II (1979–1984) turns to a discussion of Palmore v. Sidoti 
and the substantial internal debates that Palmore prompted (despite its 
ultimate unanimity) regarding remaining instantiations of race in family 
law. This Part shows that Palmore was controversial in part precisely because 
of its potential implications for other contemporary uses of race in family 
law (including particularly race-matching in adoption) and the desire of a 
number of the Justices to leave race-matching in adoption undisturbed.  
Part III (1985–1995) explores the very profound divergence that occurred 
in the post-Palmore period between the Court’s affirmative action jurispru-
dence (where the Court increasingly demanded that all uses of race be 
strictly scrutinized) and the lower courts’ approach to race in family law 
(where the courts most often declined to apply any meaningful constitutional 
scrutiny to continuing uses of race). This Part further traces these lower 
court family law decisions to the petition for certiorari stage, where they 
were repeatedly rejected by the Court, even where the affirmative action–
family law divide was squarely raised. Part IV (1996–2007) continues to 
follow this divergence through the contemporary era and discusses the 
Court’s continued failure to address even the most clear divergences from 
its ostensible demand of strict scrutiny in the family law context. Part V, in 
Epilogue, takes up the recently decided case of Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl 
and addresses the Court’s continued failure—nearly half a century after 
Loving—to meaningfully address the affirmative action–family law divide. 
Part VI turns at last to the implications of this rich history for the 
Court’s race law jurisprudence. Drawing together the historical materials 
explored in Parts I–V, this Part discusses the ways in which the Court’s 
publicly articulated rhetoric (rejecting the possibility of lesser constitutional 
scrutiny for particular uses of race) has failed to reflect its internal actions 
(facilitating precisely such a regime in the family law arena). Part VI then 
discusses the profound concerns this divergence raises, including the 
legitimacy and process defects it creates. Finally, this Part explores potential 
ways that the Court’s race law doctrine might be rendered consistent with 
its practices, including the reintroduction in the Court’s formal equal 
protection doctrine of a place for contextually and normatively based 
variations in the applicable standard of review.  
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I. RACE IN THE FAMILY FROM LOVING TO DRUMMOND: 1967–1978 
The years following the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia 
marked the high point for the constitutional invalidation of race-based 
decisionmaking in family law. During the five years following Loving, eight 
lower courts, many within the Deep South, invalidated race-based family 
law restrictions on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.20 And while many of 
these cases can be characterized as tying up the loose ends of Loving—
invalidating antimiscegenation laws in response to the intransigence of local 
officials—others reached more broadly, constitutionally invalidating statutory 
restrictions on transracial adoption and relying on Loving to open up 
inheritance rights to the relatives of interracial couples. Thus, the five-year 
period between 1967 and 1972 can fairly be characterized as the most activist 
time frame in history for the courts’ adjudication of constitutional race-
based family law claims. 
By the mid-1970s, however, this unified approach had begun to dissolve 
in the face of broader political and legal developments. Politically, the late 
1960s and early 1970s witnessed a major transformation in the discourse 
around race equality as the black power and cultural nationalism movements 
gained national prominence.21 These movements, which called for the 
celebration and preservation of black difference (and often directly for racial 
separatism), meant that for the first time minority voices became prominent 
 
20 See Compos v. McKeithen, 341 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. La. 1972) (striking down ban on inter-
racial adoption as a violation of equal protection); United States v. Brittain, 319 F. Supp. 1058 
(N.D. Ala. 1970) (overturning Alabama miscegenation bans); Davis v. Ashford, 2 Race Rel. L. 
Surv. 152 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (invalidating a Mississippi statute banning miscegenation); Davis v. 
Gately, 269 F. Supp. 996 (D. Del. 1967) (invalidating Delaware’s criminal and civil antimiscegena-
tion statutes); Van Hook v. Blanton, 206 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 1968) (per curiam) (declaring Florida’s 
antimiscegenation laws invalid); Hibbert v. Mudd, 272 So. 2d 697 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (noting that 
the lower court had relied on Loving to invalidate a law that banned miscegenous heirs from 
receiving their inheritance), rev’d on other grounds, 294 So. 2d 518 (La. 1974); Dick v. Reaves, 434 
P.2d 295 (Okla. 1967) (in the context of an inheritance dispute, invalidating Oklahoma’s antimisce-
genation law); In re Adoption of Gomez, 424 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (per curiam) 
(finding ban on interracial adoption to be unconstitutional). But cf. Vetrano v. Gardner, 290 F. 
Supp. 200 (N.D. Miss. 1968) (denying social security benefits to children of an interracial couple 
because their parents were unmarried, and rejecting a constitutional challenge to same despite the 
fact that interracial marriage was unlawful in the jurisdiction in which the parents lived during the 
relevant time frame). In contrast, during the five-year period preceding Loving, not a single lower 
court invalidated a race-based family law policy on constitutional grounds. 
21 See generally Lloren A. Foster, Black Power Movement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN 
AMERICAN HISTORY: 1896 TO THE PRESENT (Paul Finkelman ed., 2006); THOMAS J. 
SUGRUE, SWEET LAND OF LIBERTY: THE FORGOTTEN STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN 
THE NORTH (2008); Lisa Corrigan, Reimagining Black Power: Prison Manifestos and the 
Strategies of Regeneration in the Rewriting of Black Identity, 1969–2002 (2006) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with author). 
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in promoting race’s salience in family law decisionmaking.22 Indeed, by the 
early to mid-1970s, the most vocal advocates of official restrictions on 
interracial family formation tended to be minority organizations, such as the 
National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW).23 Noting the 
unique needs of minority children, such organizations argued strongly 
against interracial adoptive and foster care placements, contending that 
nonminority parents were not competent to instill a healthy sense of racial 
identity in black or biracial children.24 
Legally, the early 1970s also witnessed major transformations in the form 
of racial restrictions in family law. By 1973, most Jim Crow–era statutes 
categorically precluding interracial intimacy and family formation had been 
struck down or repealed.25 The policies that remained—many of which were 
 
22 See supra note 21 and infra note 24; cf. Susan J. Grossman, A Child of a Different Color: Race 
as a Factor in Adoption and Custody Proceedings, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 303, 331-32 (1967–1968) (describ-
ing then-existing arguments for race-matching in custody and adoption law, which derived 
predominantly from traditional adoption practices promoting the appearance of a “natural” family 
and from Jim Crow–era disapproval of race mixing). For an early decision that was particularly 
explicit in drawing on black power political concepts, see In re B. Children, 89 Misc. 2d 493 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 1977) (finding that a black child was “entitled to his ‘Black Pride’” and thus should be 
returned to the home of his biological parents rather than remaining with his white foster 
parents). 
23 KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 111-12, 393-98; Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1179-82. During this 
same time frame, Indian organizations, such as the Association on Indian Affairs, were also 
increasingly agitating for restrictions on the placement of Indian children with non-Indian 
families. See, e.g., Thalia Gonzalez, Reclaiming the Promise of the Indian Child Welfare Act: A Study of 
State Incorporation and Adoption of Legal Protections for Indian Status Offenders, 42 N.M. L. REV. 131, 
139-40 (2012) (chronicling the advocacy leading to the enactment of the ICWA); see also Maria E. 
Camposeco, Bright Hopes, Shared Heritage: Helping Latino Kids Find Roots when Adopted, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, July 8, 1992, at B1 (noting the decades-long opposition of both the NABSW and the 
Indian community to placing black or Indian children with white families). These efforts 
ultimately culminated in the successful enactment of the ICWA, a federal statute that requires the 
placement of Indian children in Indian homes in many circumstances. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23 
(2006); see also Gonzalez, supra, at 140-41 (describing the protections afforded by the ICWA). The 
ICWA has, in turn, provided a template for calls for similar legislation vis-à-vis African American 
and other minority children. See, e.g., Jessica Dixon, The African-American Child Welfare Act: A 
Legal Redress for African-American Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-
AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 112-113, 125-126 (2008) (arguing for an “African-American Child Welfare 
Act” modeled on the ICWA).  
24 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 393-98; Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1179-82 (discussing 
the opposition by NABSW and others to transracial adoption in the early 1970s). These sentiments 
would eventually come to be significantly reflected in the case law. For an interesting and nuanced 
treatment of the issues that spurred the development of NABSW’s position in this area, see 
generally Laura Briggs, Somebody’s Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 421 (2009). 
25 In addition to the antimiscegenation laws that were invalidated by Loving, many states had 
child-focused criminal or civil restrictions on interracial families during the Jim Crow era. See, e.g., 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:422 (1965) (prohibiting interracial adoptions); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS § 416 (LexisNexis 1957) (making it a criminal offense for a white 
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informal or administrative in nature—were less likely to be codified, and, at 
least in theory, less categorical, considering race as only “a factor” among 
many.26 While formal and more categorical statutes and administrative 
policies would later experience a resurgence, during the mid-1970s the 
predominant uses of race in family law tended facially to be more flexible 
and were typically justified as part of a global consideration of the child’s 
best interests.27 
Collectively, these changes in the political and legal context had a major 
impact on judicial perceptions of the legitimacy of race restrictions in 
family law. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, family law race restrictions 
had been fairly uniformly identified by the courts as vestiges of the nation’s 
Jim Crow past.28 But by the mid-1970s, this confluence of political and legal 
changes had considerably complicated the characterization of race-based 
family law decisionmaking as a form of invidious race discrimination. Like 
affirmative action, the presence of minority advocates for race-based family 
law policies—and the arguable deployment of such policies in service of a 
“benign” goal (i.e., the best interest of the child) rendered the constitutional 
assessment of racial family law policies far from unambiguous.29 Thus, as 
the dominant discourse behind race-based family law restrictions shifted, 
 
woman to conceive and bear an interracial child); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-2585 (1962) (prohibiting 
interracial children from being adopted by anyone); id. § 16-553 (making it a criminal offense to 
place a white child in “the custody, control, maintenance or support of a negro”); TEX. REV. CIV. 
STAT. ANN., arts. 46a §(8), 46b-1 §(4) (1959) (prohibiting interracial adoptions). It appears that, 
by the early 1970s, the most blatantly racist of these laws had been struck down or repealed or had 
fallen into disuse, although many statutes requiring the consideration of race in adoption 
remained. See, e.g., Compos, 341 F. Supp. at 264-68 (invalidating Louisiana’s law banning interracial 
adoption); In re Gomez, 424 S.W.2d at 657-59 (invalidating Texas law banning interracial adop-
tion); see also Grossman, supra note 22, at 306-09 (noting that, as of 1968, Louisiana and Texas were 
the only states that categorically prohibited interracial adoption, although many others required 
consideration of race).  
26 Of the race family law cases arising during the five-year period from 1973 through 1977, 
none involved a statutory or regulatory policy requiring race-matching. Instead, most involved 
informal judicial or administrative policies sanctioning race only as a factor in the best interest 
analysis. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 
1204-05 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); White v. Appleton, 304 So. 2d 
206 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974); Niles v. Niles, 299 So.2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Raysor v. 
Gabbey, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290 (App. Div. 1977). But cf. Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207-08 (Nev. 
1976) (finding that the lower court’s use of an apparently categorical approach to match children of 
an interracial marriage with their minority parent was unconstitutional).  
27 See Cynthia G. Hawkins-León & Carla Bradley, Race and Transracial Adoption: The Answer 
Is Neither Simply Black or White nor Right or Wrong, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1227, 1241 (2002) (stating 
that, as of 1987, “35 states prohibited the adoption of black children by white families”). 
28 See supra note 20. 
29 See supra note 26; see also In re B. Children, 89 Misc. 2d 493, 495-98 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977) 
(treating reliance on race as valid based in part on its benign objectives). 
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the judicial treatment of race restrictions in family law also changed direc-
tion, from near-universal rejection in the immediate post-Loving period to a 
state of profound division.30 
Mildred and Robert Drummond, a white couple from Douglasville, 
Georgia, would be one of the families ultimately caught up in these changing 
legal and political tides.31 In December 1973, the Drummonds became foster 
parents when a one-month old, mixed-race infant named Timmy was placed 
with them by the Fulton County Department of Family and Children’s 
Services (DFCS).32 While the placement was originally made on an emer-
gency basis, it soon became apparent that Timmy would not be imminently 
reunited with his biological mother.33 In late 1974, the Drummonds ex-
pressed an interest in adopting Timmy, who had by then lived with them for 
close to a year.34 
There appears to have been no question that the Drummonds provided 
excellent care for Timmy and loved him deeply. Indeed, the Drummonds’ 
care was described by DFCS personnel as “excellent,” “loving,” and “extremely 
competent.”35 Another DFCS worker noted that the Drummonds were 
“unusually attentive to the child’s medical and emotional needs and feel as if 
they are the ‘natural’ family.”36 Nevertheless, DFCS decided that Timmy 
would be better off with a black couple and that the Drummonds therefore 
would not be permitted to adopt him.37 The Drummonds were informed 
that they would be permitted to continue as Timmy’s foster parents, but 
that Timmy ultimately would be removed and placed in a black adoptive 
home.38 
While the Drummonds originally acquiesced, within months of this initial 
determination, the Drummonds sought reconsideration of their request to 
 
30 Compare supra note 26 (listing cases that treated certain race-based family law practices as 
valid based on their benign objectives), with Boone v. Boone, 565 P.2d 337, 339 (N.M. 1977) 
(“[R]acial considerations alone cannot properly determine what is in the best interests of 
children . . . .”); Commonwealth ex rel. Lucas v. Kreischer, 299 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1973) (ruling that a 
mother’s subsequent interracial marriage was not a compelling reason to deny her custody); and 
Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207-08 (Nev. 1976) (arguing that the use of race in adoption should 
be subject to rigid scrutiny). 
31 Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 837, 843 
(5th Cir. 1977), vacated and rev’d by 563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 
910 (1978). 
32 Id. at 837. Timmy’s mother was white and his father was black. Id. 
33 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1203. 
34 Drummond, 547 F.2d at 837. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 841. 
37 Id. at 837-41. 
38 Id. 
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adopt Timmy.39 And while the Drummonds’ social worker was initially 
instructed to “stall with no encouragement,” the Drummonds were ultimately 
permitted to apply for formal status as adoptive parents.40 The DFCS 
caseworker who evaluated the Drummonds as adoptive parents expressed 
limited concerns, but ultimately recommended that the Drummonds be 
permitted to adopt, noting the Drummonds and Timmy’s love for each 
other and the Drummonds’ appropriate dealings with issues concerning 
Timmy’s race.41 Nevertheless, DFCS adhered to its original decision and 
removed Timmy from the Drummonds’ home when he was two-and-a-half 
years old.42 
The Drummonds took legal action, first in federal and then in state 
court, seeking to prevent (and then reverse) Timmy’s removal from their 
home.43 Represented by pioneering civil rights lawyer Margie Pitts Hames44 
(later joined by additional counsel, including Neil Bradley of the ACLU), 
the Drummonds contended that the removal of Timmy from their home—
on the basis of their race and without any formal hearing—violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees of equal protection and due process.45 
The DFCS’s race-matching policy was, the Drummonds emphasized, 
virtually categorical and replaced what had been until recently a formal 
policy of segregation.46 Moreover, any alternative arguments raised by 
DFCS for Timmy’s removal (which included the Drummonds’ age and 
relatively racially homogeneous community) had never been articulated by 
DFCS prior to the initiation of litigation.47 
 
39 Id. at 841. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 843-46. 
42 Id. at 846-48. 
43 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Chil-
dren’s Servs., 437 U.S. 910 (1978) (No. 77-1381) [hereinafter Federal Drummond Petition]. The state 
proceeding was initiated after the federal district court suggested in its decision that some of the 
Drummonds’ claims might only be vindicated in state court. Id.; see also Drummond v. Fulton 
Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 408 F. Supp. 382, 383-84 (N.D. Ga. 1976). These 
parallel proceedings arguably should have been precluded, but no court ever reached the issue, 
apparently because it was never raised by the defendants. Memorandum from William J. Brennan, 
Jr., on Cases Held for No. 76-180, Smith v. Foster Families, to the Conference 4-5 (June 14, 1977) 
(on file with the Library of Congress, Byron R. White Papers).  
44 Margie Pitts Hames was a civil rights lawyer who litigated several important abortion 
rights and desegregation cases. Her work is discussed in greater detail in TOMIKO BROWN-
NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 409-29 (2011).  
45 Drummond, 408 F. Supp. at 382; Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 7.  
46 Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 11. 
47 Drummond, 547 F.2d at 839, 849. 
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The Drummonds’ claims were quickly rejected in the state courts, and 
by late 1976, the Drummonds’ state appeal options had been exhausted.48 
Thus, the Drummonds petitioned the Supreme Court for review of their 
state case in January 1977,49 fortuitously just weeks before the case of Smith 
v. Organization of Foster Families Equality and Reform50 (OFFER) was to be 
argued. OFFER, which addressed the constitutional validity of New York’s 
foster care procedures under the Due Process Clause, raised virtually 
identical issues as those raised by the Drummonds’ due process claims (i.e., 
whether foster parents were entitled to procedural protections prior to the 
removal of a foster child from their home).51 Because the Georgia Supreme 
Court had focused almost exclusively on, and rejected, the Drummonds’ due 
process claims, a plaintiff-favorable result in OFFER would arguably have 
compelled a reversal in Drummond as well.52 
Unfortunately for the Drummonds, while OFFER did not categorically 
foreclose the possibility that a foster family might have a constitutional 
interest warranting procedural protections, the opinion was hardly a 
resounding endorsement of foster family rights. After expressing some 
doubt as to whether the Court’s due process precedents could be extended 
to the foster care context at all, the OFFER Court concluded that, in any 
event, the procedures at issue in OFFER were constitutionally adequate.53 
As such, the Drummonds’ state case—while held by the Court for OFFER54—
was denied certiorari days after OFFER was decided.55 
 
48 Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 228 S.E.2d 839, 847 (Ga. 
1976). 
49 Docket Sheet, No. 76-984, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s 
Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers). 
50 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
51 Id. at 839. 
52 Memorandum from D.B.A, Law Clerk, on No. 76-984-CSX, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. 
Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., to the Cert Pool 4 (Mar. 21, 1977) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers). 
53 OFFER, 431 U.S. at 838-856. 
54 Docket Sheet, No. 76-984, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s 
Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers).  
55 See OFFER, 431 U.S. at 816 (rendering a decision on June 13, 1977); Drummond v. Fulton 
Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 432 U.S. 905 (1977) (denying certiorari on June 20, 
1977). The Court did recognize that Drummond also encompassed an independent equal protection 
claim but apparently believed that claim to be moot because of an erroneous belief that the 
Drummonds had received—and the defendants had not challenged—the relief they sought as a 
result of a favorable panel decision from the Fifth Circuit in the federal proceedings. See 
Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., on Cases Held for No. 76-180, Smith v. Foster 
Families, to the Conference 4-5 (June 14, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, Byron R. 
White Papers). In fact, the Defendants had sought, and had been granted, en banc review by the 
time that certiorari was denied in the state case. Order Granting Rehearing En Banc, Drummond 
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The Drummonds’ federal case, however, remained pending and would 
present the race issue much more unambiguously for the Court’s review. 
Ruling en banc in favor of DFCS shortly after the Supreme Court’s denial 
of certiorari in the Drummonds’ state case, the Fifth Circuit squarely 
rejected the Drummonds’ equal protection claims, emphatically affirming 
the constitutional validity of the use of race in adoption.56 Noting that “[i]t 
is a natural thing for children to be raised by parents of their same ethnic 
background” and that the use of race in the Drummond’s case was “simply 
another facet of finding [the child] the best possible home,” the Fifth 
Circuit held that where, as here, there was “no racial slur or stigma,” there 
was “no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.”57 
The Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion thus explicitly distinguished benign 
uses of race, like adoption, from the Court’s race law precedents involving 
invidious uses of race.58 Indeed, the primary authority on which the Fifth 
Circuit relied was the Supreme Court’s splintered decision in United Jewish 
Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. (UJO) v. Carey, the Court’s then-recent 
attempt to grapple with the proper constitutional approach to “benign” uses 
of race.59 While much of UJO’s reasoning related to the special constitutional 
significance of the specific context in which it arose (a redistricting under 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act), a plurality opinion—heavily relied on 
by the Drummond court—focused on the benign nature of the use of race at 
issue, finding a broader lack of constitutional harm where “no racial slur or 
stigma” was present.60 The Fifth Circuit’s decision thus squarely situated 
itself within the burgeoning constitutional debates over the proper approach 
to benign uses of race. And indeed, the Supreme Court was just beginning 
 
v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 547 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977). Ultimately, the 
Drummonds’ panel victory would be entirely reversed by the Fifth Circuit en banc. Drummond v. 
Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1210-11 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc).  
56 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1204-06. 
57 Id. This perception of race-matching in adoption as “natural”—later also articulated by 
other courts and internally by some of the Supreme Court’s justices—may well have arisen in part 
from strong historical norms in the adoption context of placing children with families that would 
be perceived as “natural” or biologically related to the child. See, e.g., Michelle M. Mini, Note, 
Breaking Down the Barriers to Transracial Adoptions: Can the Multiethnic Placement Act Meet This 
Challenge?, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 897, 904 (1994) (observing that “adoptions were often ‘hidden’” 
and that “[i]t was easier for the child to believe that his adoptive parents were actually his 
biological parents if they all looked the same”); see also Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-
Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67, 73 n.28 (2007) (“[U]ntil the 
advent of open adoption in the 1990s, the very point of adoption was to simulate biological 
parenthood all the way down . . . .”). 
58 Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205. 
59 430 U.S. 144 (1977). 
60 Id. at 165-68; see also Drummond, 563 F.2d at 1205 (relying on UJO for the proposition that 
the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated when there is “no racial slur or stigma”).  
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to address in earnest such debates at the time that the Fifth Circuit, en 
banc, decided Drummond. Several months earlier, in February 1977, the 
Court had granted certiorari in the affirmative action case of Regents of the 
University of California v. Bakke.61 And while both of the Court’s prior 
precedents addressing benign uses of race—UJO and the earlier case of 
DeFunis v. Odegaard—were factually or procedurally unusual cases that did 
not result in a broad circulation of the Justices’ substantive views,62 Bakke 
presented a more straightforward opportunity for the Court to elaborate its 
views.63 As such, Bakke was widely perceived—by both the public and the 
Court itself—as a major opportunity for the Court to clarify its views on 
the increasingly controversial and political question of how benign uses of 
race should be treated as a matter of equal protection doctrine.64  
True to this perception, Bakke in fact spurred, in the fall of 1977, the first 
major exchange of views among the Justices on the constitutional standing 
of affirmative action and other “benign” uses of race.65 “Unprecedented” in 
 
61 429 U.S. 1090 (1977). 
62 See UJO, 430 U.S. 144 (presenting a fractured set of opinions relying on the unique signifi-
cance of the Voting Rights Act, and a complex array of other factors, to the outcome of the case); 
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (per curiam) (finding that the case was moot and 
therefore failing to reach the substantive arguments).  
63 While not entirely uncomplicated, Bakke did involve fewer procedural and factual compli-
cations than the arguably fact-bound circumstances at issue in DeFunis and UJO. But see Bench 
Memorandum on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (Sept. 13, 1977) (on file with 
the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (raising procedural and factual argu-
ments for why Bakke was a nonideal vehicle for addressing the affirmative action issue). 
64 See Paul Delaney, U.S. Brief to Support Minority Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1977, at 
A1 (noting the sharp divide in society on how the case should be decided); Warren Weaver Jr., 
Justices Hear Bakke Arguments But Give Little Hint on Decision, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1977, at A1 
(recognizing Bakke as “probably the most significant civil rights case in 24 years”). Several 
members of the Court also noted internally the need to elucidate the constitutionality of 
affirmative action programs, and the opportunity that Bakke presented to do so. See, e.g., Memo-
randum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the 
Conference (Oct. 14, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers); 
Conference Notes of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 
(Oct. 14, 1977) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., Papers).  
65 Hundreds of pages of memos were exchanged among the Justices in Bakke prior to the first 
circulation of any draft opinion, which was an extremely unusual occurrence in the Court’s internal 
practice. See Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, to the Conference 1 (Jan. 5, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Papers) (“The combination of the Chief ’s invitation to circulate memoranda and our 
deferral of a definitive Conference vote have resulted in an unprecedented volume of circulations 
in this case.”). In contrast, UJO and DeFunis occasioned limited written circulations, and very few 
of those circulations addressed in substance the broader question of how “benign” racial classifica-
tions should be addressed. See generally File for No. 75-104, UJO v. Carey (on file with the Library 
of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers); File for No. 73-235, DeFunis v. Odegaard (on file 
with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers).  
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the volume of conference memoranda that it generated, this exchange for 
the first time made clear where the fault lines among the Justices lay.66 As 
would become much more publicly visible in the Court’s later affirmative 
action precedents, those fault lines sharply divided the Court, with many 
Justices either strongly supporting or strongly opposing the application of 
strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative action.67 Thus, while the ultimate 
 
66 Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell, Jr., supra note 65. 
67 See, e.g., Memorandum from Byron R. White on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, to the Conference 2-3 (Oct. 13, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Papers) (espousing no view on the standard of scrutiny, but concluding that the 
university’s program was constitutional); Memorandum from Warren E. Burger on No. 76-811, 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 2-3 (Oct. 21, 1977) [hereinafter Burger 
Bakke Memo] (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (expressing 
the view that affirmative action must be subject to strict scrutiny and that the Davis program was 
unconstitutional); Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 2, 7-9, 18 (Nov. 10, 1977) [hereinafter Rehnquist Bakke Memo] 
(on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (same); Memorandum from 
William J. Brennan, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 5, 
28-29 (Nov. 23, 1977) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) 
(expressing the view that affirmative action should not be subjected to strict scrutiny, but to a 
lower “reasonable[ness]” standard and concluding that the university’s program was constitution-
al); Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell, Jr., on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
to the Conference 3 (Dec. 1, 1977) [hereinafter Powell Bakke Memo] (on file with the Library of 
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (arguing that strict scrutiny was required and that the 
university’s program was unconstitutional, although some use of race might be permissible); 
Memorandum from Thurgood Marshall on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to 
the Conference 3 (Apr. 13, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Papers) (arguing against “color-blindness” as the principle by which to decide the case and arguing 
for the constitutionality of affirmative action); Memorandum from Harry A. Blackmun on No. 76-
811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 11-13 (May 1, 1978) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (implying that strict scrutiny review was not 
appropriate for “benign” uses of race and expressing the view that the university’s program was 
constitutional, though perhaps just barely); see also Conference Notes of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., on 
No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke (Dec. 9, 1977) [hereinafter Dec. 9, 1977 Confer-
ence Notes] (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Papers) (making clear that although Justice Stewart did not circulate his views in a memorandum, 
he believed that the Equal Protection Clause categorically precluded adverse government actions 
based on race). Interestingly, the internal papers suggest that there were potentially five votes on 
the Court in favor of applying strict scrutiny in Bakke, although the Justices diverged substantially 
on what the implications of strict scrutiny should be for the Davis policy. Justices Powell, Burger, 
Stewart, and Rehnquist unwaveringly expressed the opinion that strict scrutiny must be applied to 
“benign” uses of race. Powell Bakke Memo, supra, at 3-5; Burger Bakke Memo, supra, at 2-3; 
Rehnquist Bakke Memo, supra, at 7-12; Dec. 9, 1977 Conference Notes, supra. And though Justice 
White ultimately joined Justice Brennan’s opinion applying only intermediate scrutiny, he initially 
felt strongly for “political” reasons that strict scrutiny should be applied (and confusingly joined 
portions of Powell’s opinion arguing for strict scrutiny, while also joining Brennan’s opinion). 
Memorandum from C.D.L., Law Clerk, to William J. Brennan, Jr. (on file with the Library of 
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers); see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercing the Veil: William 
J. Brennan’s Account of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
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Bakke opinions showed little division on the constitutional standard—with 
four of the five Justices to reach the constitutional issue voting for a relaxed, 
intermediate level of scrutiny—internally, it was clear that deep divisions 
were emerging on the constitutional propriety of benign uses of race. 
Given this backdrop, the en banc Drummond decision—which came to 
the Court on March 29, 1978, just weeks before Bakke was decided—had 
obvious considerations favoring a grant of certiorari.68 Most notably, the 
Drummond court’s standard—one of no constitutional scrutiny for “benign” 
uses of race—was one that not even the Court’s race liberals were prepared 
to endorse.69 It thus provided an opportunity for the Court to speak on a 
unified basis regarding at least some facet of the complex and unsettled 
treatment of benign uses of race. Moreover, the Drummond Court’s reliance 
on the UJO plurality,70 a decision that would be contradicted by both of the 
constitutionally based opinions issued in Bakke,71 made the case an obvious 
candidate for a Grant, Vacate, and Remand (GVR) (i.e., a direction to the 
lower court to reexamine the issue in view of later, more authoritative 
precedent).72  
 
341, 358, 362-63, 368 (2001) (reproducing Justice Brennan’s narrative regarding the Court’s internal 
consideration of Bakke and noting Justice White’s desire for strict scrutiny); see also Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-91 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (rejecting, in a part of 
the opinion joined by Justice White, the notion that something less than strict scrutiny should 
apply); id., 438 U.S. at 356-59 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding, in an opinion joined by Justice 
White, that only intermediate scrutiny was required).  
68 Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43; see also Memorandum from Warren E. Burger 
on No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., to the Confer-
ence (June 5, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers) (noting that 
Drummond was to be discussed at the Court’s June 8, 1978, conference); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(indicating that the case was decided June 28, 1978).  
69 See Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1205 
(5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (concluding categorically that the “use of race as one of the factors [in 
placing a child for adoption] is legitimate,” based in part on the Court’s reading of UJO as 
mandating that where “there is ‘no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race’ 
there is no discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment” (quoting UJO v. Carey, 430 
U.S. 144, 165 (1977))); see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356-59 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“On the other 
hand, the fact that this case does not fit neatly into our prior analytic framework for race cases 
does not mean that it should be analyzed by applying the very loose rational-basis standard of 
review that is the very least that is always applied in equal protection cases.”). 
70 UJO, 430 U.S. at 165. 
71 See supra note 67 (setting out the Justices’ views regarding the appropriate standard of 
review in Bakke). 
72 Sara C. Benesh, GVRs and Their Aftermath in the Seventh Circuit and Beyond, 32 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 659, 662-64 (2008). 
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Despite these arguable strengths, the Court denied certiorari in Drum-
mond less than ten days before Bakke was decided.73 And while available 
records do not conclusively establish the reasons for the denial, the cert pool 
memo—drafted by one of Justice Blackmun’s law clerks and circulated to 
Justices Blackmun, Burger, White, Powell, and Rehnquist—suggests that, at 
least to some, adoption was simply different as a matter of common sense.74 
Thus, Justice Blackmun’s clerk asserted boldly without citation, “As to petrs’ 
equal protection claims, acceptance of petrs’ argument that race should not 
be considered in making adoption decisions, would defy the near-
unanimous practice of state adoption agencies and the consensus among 
psychologists and sociologists.”75 Although recognizing the potential 
doctrinal overlaps with Bakke (overlaps that had been specifically highlighted 
by the Drummonds in their petition for certiorari), the author of the memo 
dismissed Drummond without explanation as “aris[ing] in such different 
factual context [sic] that I believe a hold is unwarranted.”76  
Not all of the Justices agreed with this assessment. Justices White and 
Brennan voted to grant certiorari in Drummond, and even took the unusual 
step of noting their disagreement in the published order denying certiorari 
review.77 And two other Justices, Marshall and Stevens, struggled with their 
votes in Drummond, initially voting to grant certiorari but later changing 
 
73 Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 437 U.S. 910 (1978); 
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. 
74 Memorandum from K.E., Law Clerk, on No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of 
Family & Children’s Servs., to Cert Pool 13 (June 1, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, 
Harry A. Blackmun Papers). As to the Drummonds’ due process claim, the memorandum 
recommended a denial because, inter alia, the case was unusual insofar as the agency was initially 
unaware that Timmy was biracial and thus “[t]he presumably unusual fact that resps were 
originally unaware of the child’s race puts resps’ subsequent decision to remove Timmy from the 
Drummonds’ care in a very different perspective from the normal decision to re-place a child.” Id. 
at 12-13. 
75 Id. at 13. Justice Blackmun’s marked up version of the memo did not comment directly on 
the passage discussing the Drummonds’ equal protection claims, but he did place a check mark 
next to it, id. at 13, suggesting agreement with the point being made.  
76 Id. at 13; see also Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 25-26; cf. Memorandum from 
E.S., Law Clerk to Thurgood Marshall, on the legislative history of Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 (circulated to the Conference by Justice Marshall on Oct. 28, 1977) (on file with 
Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (discussing the legislative history of Title VI 
as it relates to affirmative action programs and noting that an amendment to Title VI that would 
have “expressly authorized federal grantees to take race into account in placing children in 
adoptive and foster homes” was rejected as unnecessary, thus supporting the inference that 
Congress did not expect to eliminate all potentially benign uses of race by enacting Title VI).  
77 See Drummond, 437 U.S. 910; see also Ryan C. Black & Ryan J. Owens, Analyzing the Relia-
bility of Supreme Court Justices’ Agenda-Setting Records, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 254, 256 (2009) (noting that 
votes of Justices as to certiorari are rarely published). 
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their votes to deny.78 But for the Court’s race conservatives—those who had 
argued most stridently that race restrictions of any kind must be subject to 
the most rigorous constitutional scrutiny during the debates on Bakke—
Drummond apparently did not present an appealing candidate for review.79 
As a result, on June 15, 1978, the Drummonds’ long legal crusade came 
quietly to an end with the denial of their petition for certiorari.80 
II. DRUMMOND TO PALMORE: 1978–1984 
The lower courts’ treatment of race in the family law context, already 
divided at the time that Drummond was decided, would become even more 
so in the period following the Court’s denial of certiorari in Drummond. 
Indeed, during the six-year period between Drummond and the Supreme 
Court’s next major race family law case (Palmore v. Sidoti), the lower courts 
would issue opinions that were almost equally divided in affirming and 
rejecting government uses of racial criteria in the family.81 This division, 
moreover, was not simply reflective of differing bottom line results, but 
instead extended to virtually every feature of race family law litigation. 
Thus, deep divisions emerged in the post-Drummond era about whether the 
use of race in family law (by public agencies or courts) was ever permissible; 
 
78 See Docket Sheet, No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s 
Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (showing a change in 
Justice Marshall’s vote from “grant” to “deny” and noting that ultimately only “B-W wd G”—i.e., 
only Brennan, and White voted to grant cert despite the fact that Stevens is shown to have voted 
for “grant”).  
79 Id. (showing that none of the Justices who endorsed strict scrutiny in the internal debates 
over Bakke, including Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Powell, voted in 
favor of review in Drummond). 
80 Drummond, 437 U.S. 910. 
81 A significant number of cases during this time affirmed lower court or agency decisions 
that relied in part on race. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 399 N.E.2d 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) 
(affirming a change in custody that considered the mother’s interracial marriage); In re Marriage of 
Kramer, 297 N.W.2d 359 (Iowa 1980) (holding that while race can be a factor, it was improperly 
used in the trial court’s decision, but nevertheless affirming the trial court’s decision on other 
grounds); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983) (allowing the consideration of race in adoption and 
foster care matters). On the other hand, several decisions during this time also reversed lower 
court or agency uses of race or rejected litigant requests to make race a dispositive factor. See, e.g., 
In re Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670, 673-74 (Iowa 1980) (considering the parents’ connection to a 
racial community in custody disputes over adoptive biracial children, but ultimately deeming it 
nondispositive); Edel v. Edel, 293 N.W.2d 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting a change in 
custody based on an interracial relationship); In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982) (noting that a change in custody based on an interracial relationship was inappropriate).  
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if so, to what extent; and what, if anything, was the role of constitutional 
adjudication (as opposed to state family law) in resolving these disputes.82 
These divisions, moreover, were not restricted simply to the adoption 
issue presented to the Court in Drummond (or to its closely related cousin, 
interracial foster care placements). Two other race-based family law practices 
continued to trouble the courts during the pre-Palmore time period, and 
both occasioned similarly divisive responses. Thus, the use of race as a “plus 
factor” for minority parents in custody disputes between interracial parents, 
as well as the use of a parent’s post-divorce interracial marriage as a basis for 
denying custody, resulted in similarly divided responses from the courts.83 
And, as in the adoption context, these divisions extended far beyond surface 
outcomes to fundamental disagreements about the legal principles under 
which race family law claims should be adjudicated. 
It was during this unsettled time that Linda Palmore and her ex-
husband, Anthony Sidoti, would find themselves litigating over whether the 
race of Linda’s new husband should result in the loss of her custody of their 
young daughter.84 Upon the couple’s divorce in 1980, Linda had been 
awarded custody of their then two-year-old daughter, Melanie.85 But just 
over a year later, Linda and Anthony were back in court, with Anthony 
 
82 See, e.g., In re Petition of R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776, 784-94 (D.C. 1982) (concluding that strict 
scrutiny was required under the Equal Protection Clause and reversing and remanding the lower 
court determination because its use of race did not meet the strictures of strict scrutiny); Palmore 
v. Sidoti, 426 So.2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (relying on the race of the mother’s spouse as a 
basis for a change in custody); Russell, 399 N.E.2d at 213-15 (concluding that the lower court 
complied with state law in relying on the mother’s interracial marriage as one factor among many); 
In re Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d at 673-74 (stating that race can be a consideration under state custody 
law, albeit not a controlling one); In re Kramer, 297 N.W.2d at 360-63 (affirming the lower court 
decision relying on race, but also stating in dicta that the lower court’s use of race was impermissi-
ble as a matter of state law); Edel, 293 N.W.2d at 794-95 (concluding that the race of the mother’s 
fiancé was an improper consideration—apparently as a matter of state law—and remanding for a 
reassessment without consideration of that factor); Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 2d 137, 140-47 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (noting that race can be a consideration under state custody law, but finding 
that here it was not controlling); In re Haven, No. C-780343, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9744, at *1-15 
(Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1979) (finding that the use of race in adoption was constitutionally 
permissible even where based on a policy of “favoring the adoption of white children by whites 
and black children by blacks”); In re Davis, 465 A.2d at 623-29 (concluding that the lower court 
erred in not considering race in a foster care/adoption dispute and finding that consideration of a 
race as a factor is constitutional); Temos, 450 A.2d at 119-22 (finding that an interracial relationship 
could not be a basis for a custody modification, but not specifying whether the ruling was based on 
constitutional principles, state law, or both). 
83 See supra note 82. 
84 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 3-4, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (No. 82-
1734) [hereinafter Palmore Petition]. 
85 Id. at 3. 
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seeking to obtain custody.86 Contending that Linda (who was white) “ha[d] 
not acted in the best interest and welfare of [Melanie] in that she ha[d] had 
a black male living with her for some period of time,” and that she had also 
been neglectful in allowing Melanie to contract lice and wear clothes stained 
with mildew, Anthony requested that he be awarded custody of Melanie, 
who was then four.87  
The trial court—while rejecting Anthony’s suggestions that Linda had 
been neglectful of Melanie’s health or clothing—found that Linda’s actions 
in dating a black man outside of wedlock were “of some significance.”88 The 
court observed, “despite the strides that have been made in bettering 
relations between the races in this country, it is inevitable that Melanie will, 
if allowed to remain in her present situation . . . suffer from the social 
stigmatization that is sure to come.”89 It thus concluded that Melanie’s best 
interests would be served by living in her father’s (monoracial) household, 
and granted his request for a custody modification.90 
This order by the trial court—issued six months after Anthony Palmore’s 
initial petition for modification—was summarily affirmed by the Florida 
District Court of Appeals in December 1982.91 As a result, under Florida 
law, the Florida Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear any further 
appeal.92 Thus, by early 1983, Linda Palmore’s state court appeal options 
had been exhausted.93 Her attorneys, after unsuccessfully seeking a stay 
from the Florida District Court of Appeals, petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court directly for a stay of Melanie’s removal from Linda’s 
custody.94  
Because the case arose in the geographical jurisdiction of the Eleventh 
Circuit, the Palmore v. Sidoti stay application was initially directed to Justice 
Powell,95 the Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit.96 Arguably, this was a 
 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 4. 
88 Id. at 26. 
89 Id. at 26-27. 
90 Id. at 27. 
91 Palmore v. Sidoti, 426 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); 
Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at *5-6.  
92 Memorandum from Caldwell, Law Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Confer-
ence 3 n.2 (Feb. 16, 1983) (on file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers).  
93 Id. at 3. 
94 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 1, 9-10, 30. 
95 Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92 (making clear that Justice Powell adjudicated 
the original Palmore stay). 
96 See Lois J. Scali, Prediction-Making in the Supreme Court: The Granting of Stays by Individual 
Justices, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1020, 1025 n.33 (1985) (setting out the identity of the individual Justices 
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good draw for the Palmore side of the case. In Bakke, Powell had affirmed a 
strong commitment to strictly scrutinizing all uses of race, including even 
those adopted with putatively benign motives.97 In addition, in Fullilove v. 
Klutznik, decided two years after Bakke, Powell had reiterated his commit-
ment to the strict scrutiny standard of review, despite finding the specific 
use of race at issue to be constitutionally valid.98 Thus, the state court’s 
decision in Palmore—uncritically relying on racial considerations without 
any form of constitutional scrutiny—seemed to facially conflict with 
Powell’s publicly expressed views on race law doctrine.99  
Powell, however, apparently regarded the Palmore case as a wholly unde-
sirable matter for the Court to take up. While the reasons are not clear from 
the internal documents, his notes on the stay have repeated annotations 
suggesting his antipathy for the case: “This is the white/black marriage-
child custody case. We should not get into this.”100 And again, on a later 
date: “Deny[.] This is [the] case where petr—a white woman remarried a 
black. She & first husband are fighting over child custody . . . .”101 
Under Supreme Court rules, however, Powell was not the final word on 
whether Linda Palmore’s stay request would be granted. Then, as now, a 
stay applicant may reapply to any other Justice following the denial of a 
stay.102 Thus, following Powell’s initial denial of the stay, Linda Palmore 
reapplied to Justice Marshall, who, in accordance with Court convention, 
referred the matter to the full Court.103 There, her stay request piqued 
 
assigned to hear stays from particular circuits at roughly the time that the Palmore stay would have 
been considered).  
97 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) (stating 
that all racial and ethnic distinctions must be subjected to strict scrutiny). 
98 448 U.S. 448, 496-99, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that adherence to a strict 
scrutiny standard is “important and consistent with precedent”). 
99 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 26-27. Of course, as the work of Anders Walker has 
unearthed, Powell’s views on race and the law were complex and derived from a view that racial 
separatism and segregation could potentially foster genuine pluralism. Anders Walker, Diversity’s 
Strange Career: Recovering the Racial Pluralism of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
647, 648, 672-77 (2010). Viewed through this lens, it is perhaps less surprising that Powell did not 
view racial integration within the family as a particularly desirable matter for the Court to take up. 
100 Handwritten Notation on Memorandum from Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk of Court, on 
No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Conference (Feb. 18, 1983) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers). 
101 Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92; Handwritten Notation on Docket Sheet, A-
664, Palmore v. Sidoti (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of 
Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers). 
102 SUP. CT. R. 22.  
103 Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92; see also Scali, supra note 96, at 1021 (explain-
ing that such reapplications are almost universally referred to the full court and subsequently 
denied). 
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greater interest, with six of the Justices—including all of the Court’s race 
liberals—“calling for a response” (i.e., requesting that the Respondent 
submit a statement in response to the stay application).104 
The resulting response was, in the words of Powell’s law clerk, “misera-
ble.”105 While contending that other, nonracial factors also influenced the 
trial court’s decision, Sidoti conceded that race was a salient factor.106 
Additionally, Sidoti’s primary constitutional argument—that Florida 
authority held only “that the effect of an interracial marriage upon a 
particular child is one of the many factors that may be considered in determining 
the best interest of the child”107—was arguably in significant tension with 
other constitutional decisions of the Court, which had recognized that even 
partial influence, where dispositive, violates the Constitution.108 
On the other hand, the response also had, according to Powell’s clerk, 
“[o]ne key point.”109 “The mandate [was] issued in February” and thus by 
the time the full Court considered the issue, Melanie was already in Sidoti’s 
custody.110 As Powell’s clerk observed, “therefore by this Court’s own delay, 
the application appears moot—the irreparable injury has occurred already.”111 
He thus concluded that “TM [Thurgood Marshall] blew it,” an apparent 
reference to Justice Marshall’s desire (contrary to Powell’s own) to have the 
Court grant a stay.112 
 
104 See Docket Sheet, A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (Feb. 18, 1984) (on file with Library of Con-
gress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (identifying Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, 
Stevens and O’Connor as calling for a response, and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and 
Rehnquist as voting against). 
105 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (Mar. 2, 
1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Papers). 
106 See Memorandum of A.S.M., Law Clerk, to Harry A. Blackmun, on No. A-664, Palmore 
v. Sidoti (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers). 
107 Id. (emphasis added). 
108 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (holding that partial 
influence of an unconstitutional consideration, where dispositive, violates the Constitution); 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977) (explaining 
that where race was a motivating factor, a defendant could avoid constitutional liability only by 
showing that “the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been 
considered”). But see Banks, Color of Desire, supra note 5, at 904-05 (describing a number of 
contexts in which the courts have treated classifications involving “race as a factor” as if they did 
not entail a racial classification). 
109 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, supra note 105. 
110 Id. 
111 Id.; see also Memorandum from A.S.M., Law Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to 
Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) 
(expressing a similar sentiment regarding the case’s mootness). 
112 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, supra note 105; see also Memorandum 
from Thurgood Marshall on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Conference (Feb. 18, 1983) (on 
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Indeed, when the Court voted on the merits of the stay two days later, it 
overwhelmingly voted to deny.113 Only Justice Stevens, in a move he would 
later note as a particular point of pride, voted to grant the stay.114 And while 
the Court would ultimately grant certiorari and rule unanimously in Linda 
Palmore’s favor—elevating her case to canonical status—for Palmore herself, 
the stay decision would prove to be the one that mattered. During the two 
years following Melanie’s removal, Palmore would see her daughter only 
once, on a court-ordered visit three months after the Supreme Court ruled 
in her favor.115 By 1986, more than two years after her putative victory in the 
Supreme Court, Palmore was reportedly preparing to sign papers awarding 
custody of Melanie to her husband in exchange for visitation rights,116 still 
not having reestablished even regular contact with her daughter.117  
At the time, however, Linda Palmore could not have known that a Su-
preme Court decision in her favor would ultimately have little effect. Thus, 
in April 1983, shortly after the denial of the stay by the full Court, she 
petitioned for a writ of certiorari.118 Contending that the trial court rested 
its decision solely on the race of her husband, Palmore argued that, under 
Loving v. Virginia, “[t]he equal protection and due process clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . prohibit a court . . . from relying upon a 
subsequent interracial marriage . . . as a ground for ordering a change in 
custody.”119 She further observed that her case was different from others 
where the Court had approved the use of race, noting that “[n]o modern 
decision of this Court has sustained a racial classification which burdens or 
stigmatizes black citizens on the basis of race.”120  
Despite the relatively extended discussion that the Palmore stay applica-
tion had prompted, the cert pool memorandum addressing the Palmore 
petition—drafted by one of Justice Powell’s law clerks and circulated to 
Justices Powell, O’Connor, Rehnquist, Blackmun, Burger, and White—
 
file with the Library of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers) (indicating that Marshall would 
grant the stay). 
113 Docket Sheet, No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington and Lee Uni-
versity School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers); Palmore v. Sidoti, 460 U.S. 1018 (1983) 
(denying stay).  
114 Docket Sheet, No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 113; see also John Paul Stevens, 
Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2006). 
115 Andrew M. Williams, Domestic News, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21, 1984, available at 
LexisNexis Academic.  
116 TV Drama ‘Fictionalized’ Custody Fight, Lawyer Says, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 
1986, at 34A. 
117 Id. 
118 Palmore Petition, supra note 84. 
119 Id. at 17. 
120 Id. at 16. 
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devoted a mere two-and-a-half double-spaced pages to Palmore’s request for 
certiorari review.121 Noting that “[i]t appears . . . that the principal reason 
for denying the stay was that the case did not appear cert-worthy to four 
Justices,” Powell’s clerk observed that “[n]othing has happened in the last 
three months to make this case any more cert-worthy now than it was 
then.”122 Without discussing the merits or independent cert-worthiness of 
Palmore’s claims further, Powell’s clerk recommended that the Court deny 
review.123 
This framing of the issue, and of the stay proceedings as having been 
predicated on Palmore’s merits, was arguably at least partially misleading. 
After all, just months earlier, Powell’s chambers had contended that the 
principal reason for denying the stay was its mootness, an issue material only 
to the stay proceedings’ requirement of “irreparable injury.”124 Nevertheless, 
the pool memorandum drafted by Powell’s law clerk failed to even mention the 
different standards that applied to a stay or the possibility that those standards 
cut against affording too much weight to the initial stay proceedings.125  
On the other hand, it appears that Powell’s clerk was in fact correct that 
there was not widespread support on the Court for a grant of certiorari in 
Palmore. At first, only two Justices, Brennan and Stevens, voted unequivo-
cally to grant certiorari review.126 Two other Justices, Marshall and 
Blackmun, cast “Join-3” votes, signifying that their vote should count as a 
grant vote only if there were three others in favor.127 Thus, Palmore squeaked 
by on the narrowest of margins, granted review only as a result of a change in 
Justice Marshall’s vote from a “Join 3” to a “Grant” after the initial polling.128 
The Court’s reluctance to grant review—despite Palmore’s presentation of 
an issue that many today would characterize as having obvious constitutional 
 
121 Memorandum from M.S., Law Clerk, on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Cert Pool 
(June 9, 1983) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) [hereinafter 
Palmore Cert Pool Memo]. 
122 Id. at 3. 
123 Id. 
124 Handwritten Notation of M.N. on Docket Sheet, supra note 105; see also Memorandum 
from Caldwell, supra note 92 (setting out the four requirements needed for a stay to be granted, 
including irreparable injury). 
125 Palmore Cert Pool Memo, supra note 121, at 3. 
126 Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry 
A. Blackmun Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington 
and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers). 
127 See supra note 126; see also Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme 
Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1239 (2012) (explaining that a “Join-3” is 
counted as a “Grant” vote only if at least three other Justices vote in favor of granting review). 
128 Four Justices must vote in favor in order for a case to be granted certiorari. Owens & 
Simon, supra note 127, at 1227. 
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significance—may have reflected factors unrelated to the Justices’ views of 
the fundamental legal question it presented. The appellate court did not 
write a decision in Palmore, and thus there was only the trial court’s terse 
order for the Court’s review.129 Moreover, it was not entirely clear whether 
the interracial marriage issue had been the sole consideration in the change 
of custody, although all of the Justices seem to have agreed that it was the 
predominant factor.130 In addition, the lower courts—both the trial court in 
Palmore itself and others that had addressed the same issue—had typically 
ignored constitutional arguments raised by the parties, instead relying on 
state custody law.131 Thus, while Palmore was typical of the period’s race 
family law cases in both substance and format, it was arguably a nonideal 
vehicle for certiorari review by traditional Supreme Court standards.132 
But there were also substantive reasons—later articulated during the 
course of the Palmore proceedings—why many of the Justices may have seen 
Palmore as a troubling case to take up. Among other things, while the 
Justices widely viewed the removal of a child from a natural parent based on 
that parent’s interracial marriage (the issue in Palmore) to be constitutionally 
impermissible, they did not share the same view of other remaining uses of 
race in family law, particularly adoption.133 As such, several of the Justices 
 
129 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 21-24; see also Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 
92 (noting that this factor made the case somewhat less appealing for review, although review was 
probably warranted); Memorandum from M.E.N., Law Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to 
Lewis S. Powell (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, 
Jr., Papers) (noting the absence of an appellate opinion as a reason to deny review in the case); 
Typewritten Notation, Palmore Cert Pool Memo, supra note 121, at 1 (noting this issue but 
recommending a “Grant”). 
130 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 21-24; see also Memorandum from M.E.N., supra note 
129 (noting this concern, but also noting that the interracial marriage “was decisive to the courts 
below”); Handwritten Notation on Memorandum from M.S., Law Clerk, on No. 82-1734, Palmore 
v. Sidoti, to the Cert Pool (Sept. 19, 1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School 
of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (noting this concern, but also noting that racial factors appear 
to have predominated); Memorandum from Caldwell, supra note 92 (same); cf. Memorandum 
from Warren E. Burger to William J. Brennan (Mar. 21, 1984) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (resisting Brennan’s efforts to argue that the draft 
opinion should be modified to broadly prohibit the use of race as a factor on the grounds that 
“[r]ace was the dispositive basis and that surely is clear”). 
131 Palmore Petition, supra note 84, at 21-24; see also supra note 82. 
132 See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text; see also Memorandum from A.S.M., Law 
Clerk, on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Harry A. Blackmun 2 (Mar. 3, 1983) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (suggesting that “it might be better to await a 
clear constitutional conflict before granting a case involving the problem [of interracial marriage 
and child custody cases]”). 
133 See Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (documenting the unanimous vote in Palmore on the merits); see 
also Memorandum from Lewis S. Powell on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 2 (Jan. 31, 1984) (on file 
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(largely the Court’s race conservatives),134 expressed deep concerns that a 
ruling in favor of Linda Palmore might be read to prohibit the restriction of 
transracial adoptions.135 Indeed, this issue—whether a ruling precluding the 
 
with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (showing 
that although Powell opposed granting review, he agreed that the lower court’s use of race was 
“invalid” once the petition for certiorari was granted); cf. Post-Argument Memorandum from 
K.R.B., Law Clerk, on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 2 (Feb. 22, 1984) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Byron R. White Papers) (arguing that while the lower court decision might be flawed 
because of the lack of evidence of harm, a categorical rule was unjustified because “I do not 
understand why the Constitution should consign [a child] to an inferior home on the ground that 
factually relevant, but legally irrelevant, criteria cannot be considered”).  
134 For a discussion of which Justices articulated concerns regarding the adoption issue and 
their broader positions at the time regarding the necessity of subjecting putatively benign uses of 
race to strict scrutiny, see infra notes 135-42. See generally supra note 12 for a definitional 
discussion of how specific Justices were classified as “race conservatives,” “race liberals,” or “race 
moderates,” for the purposes of this Article. 
135 See, e.g., Blackmun Conference Notes on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti [hereinafter 
Blackmun Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti] (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. 
Blackmun Papers)  (noting the following Justices’ remarks—Chief Justice: “W[oul]d n[ot] touch 
adoption”; Rehnquist: “Eschew adoption”; Stevens: “[A]doption agencies do try to ac-
com[modate]”); Brennan Conference Notes on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti [hereinafter 
Brennan Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti] (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Papers) (including the following remarks—Chief Justice: “This is custody, not 
adoption, which I wouldn’t touch”; Powell: “Agree with CJ”; Rehnquist: “Agree with CJ”); Oral 
Argument Notes of Justice Powell on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti [hereinafter Palmore Oral 
Argument Notes] (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. 
Powell, Jr., Papers) (“Adoption is different.”); Powell Conference Notes on No. 72-1734, Palmore v. 
Sidoti  [hereinafter Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti] (on file with the Washington and 
Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (noting the following—Chief Justice: 
“No[t] like an adoption case—this would be different”; White: “Agree with CJ”; Rehnquist: 
“Avoid discussion of adoption—not here”; Stevens: “If this were an adoption case, it would be 
different. Biological considerations are important”); see also Post-Argument Memorandum from 
K.R.B., supra note 133, at 3 (expressing concerns that a broadly written opinion in Palmore would 
interfere with the common practice of adoption agencies to place children with parents of the 
same race as the child, and might also interfere with similar practices in the custody context); 
Memorandum from E.T. on No. 72-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Harry A. Blackmun 8 (Feb. 17, 
1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (expressing the view that 
“adoption is different”). This attention to adoption is perhaps unsurprising given that the 
Respondent in Palmore repeatedly attempted to draw parallels to the adoption context in arguing 
in support of the use of race at issue in Palmore. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-7, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (No. 82-1734) (relying 
on Drummond to argue that the Court had specifically rejected “[a]ny claim that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits a state from considering racial attitudes in determining the child’s 
welfare”); Brief for Respondent at *6-13 & n.8 & n.23, & *14 n.33, Palmore, 466 U.S. 429 (No. 82-
1734) (seeking to equate the type of classification at issue in Palmore with the adoption context, and 
to distinguish both from the type of classification at issue in Loving); Oral Argument Transcript, 
Palmore v. Sidoti, No. 82-1734 [hereinafter Palmore Oral Argument Transcript], available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1983/1983_82_1734/#transcript-text554  (drawing parallels to 
adoption, in argument for the state, at oral argument). The Solicitor General’s brief in Palmore also 
noted possible parallels to adoption but argued that there were potential distinguishing factors that 
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use of race in Palmore would compel a similar result in the adoption con-
text—was of such central concern to the Justices that it was among the first 
questions posed to Linda Palmore’s counsel at oral argument.136 (Counsel 
assured the Justices that adoption—which involved “a person who was not a 
biological parent”—was “much different than [what] we have here.”137) 
At the conference for Palmore, the adoption concern again surfaced, with 
several of the Court’s race conservatives (and Justice Stevens) arguing that 
the Palmore decision should not be drafted in such a way as to extend to 
adoption.138 Adoption, those Justices noted, was “different.”139 “Biological 
considerations,” they argued, mattered in the adoption context and might 
mandate a different result.140 They thus profoundly differentiated between 
the specific custody issue before the Court and adoption, which several 
Justices opined they “wouldn’t touch.”141 Ultimately, three Justices (Burger, 
Rehnquist and Stevens) all specifically noted in conference that the decision 
in Palmore should be drafted to avoid the adoption issue, a sentiment with 
which Justices White and Powell (and possibly also Justice O’Connor) 
apparently agreed.142 
 
could allow the Court to strike down the use of interracial marriage in custody while leaving 
adoption open to future consideration. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, at 21 n.8, Palmore, 466 U.S. 429 (No. 82-1734) [hereinafter United States Palmore Brief]; 
see also Memorandum from E.T., supra note 135 (discussing the Solicitor General’s position on this 
issue). 
136 Palmore Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 135. 
137 Id. 
138 Blackmun Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; Brennan Conference Notes, 
Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135. 
139 Supra note 138. By contrast, Justice Blackmun expressed disagreement with this point and 
believed that an “[a]doption case may not be different.” Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. 
Sidoti, supra note 135.  
140 Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; see also supra note 138. 
141 Brennan Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135; see also supra note 138. 
142 See supra note 135; see also Palmore Oral Argument Notes, supra note 135, at 2 (identifying 
Justice O’Connor as the source of questioning about adoption concerns at oral argument). All of 
these Justices can be characterized as race conservatives or race moderates at the time Palmore was 
decided. Since Bakke, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Powell had internally 
expressed the view that all uses of race had to be subjected to strict scrutiny; however, they varied 
in the time frame during which they first publicly expressed that view, as well as in the extent to 
which they believed that specific affirmative action programs should accordingly be invalidated. 
See supra note 67 (documenting the internal circulations in Bakke); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. 
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (Powell, joined by Burger and Rehnquist, expressing the 
view that strict scrutiny was required and that the use of race at issue was invalid); Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496-99, 523-35 (1980) (Stewart, joined by Rehnquist and Powell, 
expressing the view that strict scrutiny was required, but dividing on whether the specific program 
was constitutional); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (showing that 
only Powell reached the constitutional issue and would have required strict scrutiny). Justice 
Stevens had historically opposed affirmative action, but was, at the time, beginning to drift to the 
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If the Court’s race conservatives were concerned about Palmore’s poten-
tial implications for adoption, several of its race liberals were concerned 
about its possible meaning for the ongoing battles over affirmative action.143 
Despite the apparent victory that the Court’s race liberals had achieved in 
Fullilove v. Klutznick (the Court’s then–most recent foray into the affirma-
tive action arena), the 1983 Term marked a tenuous time for affirmative 
action on the Court.144 Ronald Reagan, elected in 1980, had staked out an 
anti-affirmative action position in his campaign.145 And, the October 1983 
Term—with the Title VII case of Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts—
marked the first major opportunity for the Reagan Administration to 
articulate its views to the Court.146  
The Stotts brief, signed by Solicitor General Rex Lee, was true to 
Reagan’s anti-affirmative action platform.147 The district court in Stotts had 
modified a Title VII consent decree (which, as originally written, would 
have required layoffs to occur in straight seniority order) to avoid reversing 
 
left and would ultimately join the race liberals on the Court. Diane Marie Amann, John Paul 
Stevens and Equally Impartial Government, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 885, 887-90 (2010). And Justice 
White, who had initially embraced intermediate scrutiny in Bakke, was drifting to the right and 
would soon provide the dispositive vote on the Court for applying strict scrutiny to state and local 
government affirmative action. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-95 
(1989) (showing that Justice White joined the plurality opinion applying strict scrutiny); id. at 520 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (providing the fifth vote in Croson for strict scrutiny); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
356 (Brennan, J., concurring) (showing that Justice White joined Justice Brennan’s concurrence 
requiring only intermediate scrutiny). Interestingly, this transition may have marked relatively 
little change on the personal level, as Justice White apparently felt in Bakke that strict scrutiny was 
the appropriate standard and acceded to intermediate scrutiny only at Justice Brennan’s urging. See 
supra note 67. 
143 See infra notes 161-65. It is not entirely clear how broadly this concern was shared among 
the Court’s race liberals (and Justice Stevens, then drifting toward the race liberal camp), but it 
appears that Justices Stevens, Blackmun, and Marshall all may have identified the implications for 
affirmative action as a potential concern in Palmore. 
144 See 448 U.S. at 492-54 (affirming, in a fractured set of opinions, the constitutionality of a 
federal set-aside for minority businesses). 
145 See Neal Devins, Affirmative Action After Reagan, 68 TEX. L. REV. 353, 354 (1989) (con-
trasting the affirmative action initiatives instituted during the Carter Administration with Reagan’s 
emphasis on equal opportunity without “inherently discriminatory” requirements). 
146 467 U.S. 561, 578-83 (1984) (holding that the district court had improperly modified an 
existing consent decree to require race-based deviations from an otherwise applicable seniority 
system, despite the fact that the district court action was intended to preserve recent black hiring 
gains). See generally GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 10-43 (2000) 
(surveying the development of the Court’s reasoning in affirmative action decisions from the 1950s 
through the 1980s). 
147 See infra notes 149-150 and accompanying text (describing the Solicitor General’s argu-
ments in favor of the petitioners). 
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recent gains in the hiring of black firefighters.148 Filing on the side of the 
white workers, Solicitor General Lee’s brief contended that Title VII 
broadly precluded the district court’s action—and the use of race generally 
to favor minority workers—except where those workers were specifically 
identified victims of discrimination.149 More ominously (from the perspec-
tive of the Court’s race liberals), the Solicitor General’s brief also suggested 
that the disputed action in Stotts—by benefitting nonvictim minority 
employees—might violate the Equal Protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment.150 
Four months later, this “suggestion” in Stotts would become an explicit 
argument in the case of Bratton v. City of Detroit.151 Bratton involved the City 
of Detroit’s voluntary adoption of racial targets for hiring and promoting 
black officers on its police force, an effort undertaken after decades of racial 
discrimination within the Department.152 White police officers had chal-
lenged the affirmative action program on both statutory and constitutional 
grounds, contending that the program’s explicit use of racial criteria violated 
Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.153 In December 1983, after losing 
in the Sixth Circuit, the white officers petitioned for certiorari review by 
the Supreme Court.154 
In a move widely perceived as a victory for the anti-affirmative action 
faction within the Reagan Administration, the Solicitor General’s office 
filed a brief supporting the white police officers’ request for certiorari 
review.155 Marking the first time that the Administration had argued directly 
 
148 Stotts, 467 U.S. at 565-67. The consent decree had provided for hiring targets of minority 
workers, but had not disrupted the seniority-based rules for layoffs. The district court modified the 
consent decree to avoid the possibility that straight seniority layoffs would wipe out the recent 
hiring gains of minority workers under the consent decree. 
149 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 11-29, Stotts, 467 
U.S. 561 (Nos. 82-206, 82-229). 
150 Id. at 29-31 (“[T]he court of appeals’ holding raises the issue of constitutionality of a race 
conscious order under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”).  
151 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984), abrogated by Wygant v. 
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
152 Id. at 882, 888-90.  
153 Id. at 881. 
154 See id. at 884, 897-98 (rejecting the officers’ Title VII and constitutional claims); see also 
Robert Pear, U.S. Attacks Plan that Sets Quotas for Hiring Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1983, at 1 
(describing the government’s brief urging Supreme Court review and arguing against the hiring 
and promotion plan). 
155 See, e.g., Pear, supra note 154 (“The filing of the brief indicated that . . . [the] Assistant 
Attorney General for civil rights[] had prevailed within the Administration over people . . . who 
had argued that race-conscious affirmative action plans were legal and constitutional.”); see also 
Robert Pear, Administration Is Hoping to Force Court to Confront Racial Quotas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
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to the Court that affirmative action was unconstitutional, the brief contended 
broadly that voluntary affirmative action plans employing explicit racial 
criteria violated the Equal Protection Clause.156 Moreover, the Administra-
tion contended that this was so even in cases such as Bratton, where such 
affirmative action plans were undertaken in response to “undeniable past 
discrimination against blacks.”157 The position staked out by the administra-
tion in Bratton—that voluntary affirmative action, even where designed to 
address past racial discrimination by the state itself, was constitutionally 
impermissible—was thus on the far extremes of the affirmative action 
debates.158 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the Reagan Administration’s brief 
in Palmore—filed days after its Bratton brief—was greeted with some 
suspicion by the Court’s race liberals.159 On its face, the brief (filed in 
support of Linda Palmore) appeared to contain little that could arouse the 
Court’s race liberals’ ire. The fundamental position the brief expressed—
that the lower court’s use of interracial marriage to deprive Linda Palmore 
of custody was constitutionally invalid—was one with which the Court’s 
race liberals (and indeed, ultimately all of its Justices) agreed.160 Moreover, 
nowhere did the brief explicitly suggest that the lower court’s actions—
relying on the child’s “best interests” to transfer custody away from a white 
woman—could be considered akin to affirmative action. 
But, read in the context of the Administration’s mounting campaign 
against affirmative action, it is not difficult to see how some of the Justices 
saw the brief in a different, fundamentally less innocuous, light. Read in 
light of that campaign, the Administration’s argument in Palmore that “[t]he 
Equal Protection Clause does not ‘protect’ certain racial classes to the 
exclusion of others; it protects all persons from invidious racial classifica-
tion” must have appeared to the Justices directed less at the possibility that 
black parents who married interracially might be subject to the same rules 
 
1983, at B13 (describing the brief as a “translat[ion of] the Administration’s political campaign 
against affirmative action”); Philip Perlmutter, Op-Ed., A New Kind of Discrimination, BOS. 
GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1984, at A19.  
156 See Pear, supra note 154. 
157 Id.; see also Bratton, 704 F.2d at 888-90 (affirming a finding of a history of discrimination 
against black police officers in Detroit).  
158 See generally Pear, supra note 154. 
159 Compare id.(dating the filing of the Administration’s Bratton brief as Friday, December 2, 
1983), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Palmore v. Sidoti, 
466 U.S. 429 (1984) (No. 82-1734) (filed on Friday, Dec. 9, 1983). 
160 Brief for the United States, supra note 159, at 7-9; see also Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434 (“The 
effects of racial prejudice . . . cannot justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the 
custody of its natural mother . . . .”). 
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and more to the broader question of whether the race of the victim “mat-
ters” in equal protection adjudication.161 Similarly, the Administration’s 
exhortation that “[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motiva-
tion, is presumptively invalid” must have seemed targeted less at the best 
interest of the child argument in Palmore and more to the wider debates 
over “benign” motivations in race law.162  
Thus, while the Court’s race liberals (and ultimately all of its Justices) 
supported the result urged by the Solicitor General in Palmore, a number of 
them were deeply skeptical of the reasoning proposed in the Administra-
tion’s amicus brief. Indeed, Justice Stevens—who alone among the Justices 
appears to have been concerned both about the affirmative action and the 
adoption implications of Palmore—went so far as to urge that the Justices 
avoid the potential implications of the Solicitor General’s reasoning by 
eschewing an equal protection rationale altogether.163 Instead, Justice 
Stevens urged that the Court rely on the due process reasoning that the 
Court had expressed in Stanley v. Illinois, an approach that at least one other 
Justice, Justice Blackmun, appears to have been prepared to endorse.164 
While ultimately Stevens’s proposal did not obtain significant support 
among the other Justices, it appears to have been reflective of a broader 
feeling that the Solicitor General’s approach was intended to—and could in 
fact—bleed into the Court’s ongoing affirmative action debates.165 
 
161 Brief of the United States, supra note 159, at 9. 
162 Id. at 8 (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)). 
163 See Brennan Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (noting for Justice Ste-
vens, “I think its [sic] quite appropriate in writing the opinion that we not follow SG approach—
better is BRW’s due process approach in Stanley v. Illinois”); Blackmun Conference Notes, 
Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (noting for Justice Stevens, “[D]o n[ot] buy SG’s broad approach. 
Stanley v. Ill [illegible] is + way, ie, DP, n[ot] EP”). Interestingly, at least one Justice’s notes 
connect Justice Stevens’ preference for Due Process instead to his concerns over adoption. See 
Powell Conference Notes, Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (noting for Justice Stevens, “Stanley v. 
Ill due process rationale is preferred analysis. If we rely on E/P we might prejudge adoption”).  
164 Id.; see also Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notation on First Draft of Burger Opinion, 
No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) 
(Mar. 15, 1984) (noting, “Prefer DP, n[ot] EP Stanley v. Ga?”); Blackmun Conference Notes, 
Palmore v. Sidoti, supra note 135 (showing a check mark next to Stevens’ recorded remarks 
regarding the preferability of relying on the Stanley v. Illinois approach). See generally Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating a statutory provision that presumed unwed fathers were 
unfit parents on equal protection and due process grounds).  
165 See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text; see also Bench Memorandum on No. 82-
1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Thurgood Marshall 5 n.3 (Feb. 22, 1984) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers) (“An ulterior motive for the SG’s brief seeking to strike 
down the racially discriminatory ruling of the Florida Court may be the SG’s desire to emphasize 
the point that racial considerations are illicit in all contexts—including the affirmative action 
context.”); cf. Brief for the ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-14, Palmore, 
466 U.S. 429 (No. 82-1734) (relying on colorblindness rhetoric and affirmative action precedents 
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Ultimately, however, the opinion drafted by Chief Justice Burger in Pal-
more would not strongly implicate either of these sets of concerns. As Justice 
Blackmun’s law clerk observed, the reasoning of the initial draft was “diffi-
cult to get much [of]  a handle on.” Thus, the Burger draft employed fairly 
sweeping rhetoric about the racial harm being remedied while couching its 
holding in terms that had ambiguous salience for other legal contexts.166 As 
a result, none of the Justices apparently felt their previously expressed 
concerns were sufficiently implicated by Burger’s draft to warrant a request 
for revisions (although one internal notation suggests that those concerns 
remained at the time the draft was circulated).167  
Indeed, only Justice Brennan—concerned that the opinion could be read 
to permit the use of race where it was only a partial (as opposed to disposi-
tive) consideration—raised any dispute at all regarding the reasoning that 
Chief Justice Burger employed in his initial draft.168 And when the Chief 
Justice responded that a narrow holding was indeed warranted—and made 
only minor modifications to his draft—even Justice Brennan nevertheless 
joined.169 Thus, the Court’s final ruling, issued on April 25, 1984, was 
 
to argue that the use of race in Palmore was invalid, but specifically noting that the use of race in 
remedial contexts should be treated differently).  
166 Memorandum from E.T. on No. 72-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Harry A. Blackmun (Mar. 
16, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers); see also First Draft of 
Burger Opinion, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 5-6 (Mar. 15, 1984) (on file with the Library of 
Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (stating that the Constitution cannot tolerate prejudice, 
but offering little guidance on how to apply that principle outside the context of the specific facts 
of the case). 
167 See generally Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 402, Folder 11 (showing no mention, in the 
circulated memoranda on file, of a request by any of the Justices to revise Justice Burger’s draft due 
to affirmative action or adoption concerns); see also Handwritten Notation on First Draft of Burger 
Opinion, supra note 166, at 1 (querying internally, “[S]h[oul]d th[ere] b[e] a reservation w[ith] 
r[espect] t[o] adoption? [P]refer DP, n[ot] EP Stanley v. Ga?”).  
168 See Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to 
Warren E. Burger (Mar. 20, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Papers) (suggesting changes to the opinion that would clarify that race cannot be used as a 
consideration in any respect in the child custody context, even when such consideration is not 
dispositive); see also Memorandum from E.T., supra note 166 (noting shortly prior to Brennan’s 
memorandum that “that there is some discussion about encouraging the CJ to make this opinion 
stronger—to make clear that race not only cannot be the dispositive factor, but that it is an 
impermissible consideration in a child custody termination proceeding”); Handwritten Notation 
on First Draft of Burger Opinion, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 5 (Mar. 15, 1984) (on file with the 
Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (noting that the passage prohibiting race 
from being a “dispositive” consideration should be changed to preclude race “in any respect 
whatever be[ing] a” basis for a denial of custody). 
169 See Memorandum from Warren E. Burger on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to William 
J. Brennan, Jr. (Mar. 21, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., 
Papers) (explaining the rationale behind a narrow holding); see also Second Draft of Burger 
Opinion, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti 3 (Apr. 19, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, 
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unanimous in favor of Linda Palmore, bearing no external signs of the 
internal concerns that the case had initially aroused.170 
III. PALMORE TO ADARAND: 1985–1995 
The next ten years—from 1985 to 1995—would mark a turning point in 
both affirmative action case law and race family law in the United States. In 
the affirmative action context, the Court’s constitutional standards for 
reviewing affirmative action—still arguably hospitable to the race liberals’ 
preferred intermediate scrutiny standard at the time that Palmore was 
decided—would turn first tentatively, and then decisively, toward strict 
scrutiny review.171 Thus, in 1986 the Court would issue a decision in which 
four of the Justices publicly called for strict scrutiny review (a view that 
many of the still-serving race conservatives had privately expressed as early 
as Bakke), with a fifth declining to publicly endorse a standard.172 And by 
mid-1989, the Court had decisively held that all state and local government 
uses of race must be subjected to strict scrutiny; a holding extended, after 
initial equivocation, to the federal government in 1995.173 Thus the decade 
between 1985 and 1995 marked a dramatic change in the Court’s affirmative 
action precedents, away from the fractured opinions that characterized the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (opinions at least partially favorable to the 
position of the Court’s race liberals) to a solid majority in favor of applying 
 
William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) (maintaining the narrow holding from the original draft); 
Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr., on No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti, to Chief Justice 
Burger (Apr. 20, 1984) (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers) 
(agreeing to join the Chief Justice’s opinion).  
170 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
171 At the time that Palmore was decided, the Court had decided three significant cases on 
“benign” uses of race: United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc.(UJO) v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 
(1977); Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448 (1980). In each of these cases, there was no majority opinion regarding the proper 
standard of scrutiny to be applied, and a plurality of Justices articulated support for something less 
than strict scrutiny. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 517-21 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Justices 
Brennan and Blackmun); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall, &Blackmun, JJ., 
concurring); UJO, 430 U.S. at 148-65 (plurality opinion).  
172 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986) (plurality opinion) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny to the use of race in the context of layoff decisions regarding public school 
teachers); id. at 295 (White, J., concurring). 
173 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring) (making clear that strict scrutiny must be applied to 
“benign” state and local government uses of race); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 227 (1995) (applying the same standard to the federal government and overruling in relevant 
part Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)). 
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the most stringent standard of constitutional review even to “benign” uses 
of race. 
This turn—perceived at the time as a major upheaval in the Court’s race 
law jurisprudence174—was justified by the Court primarily through two core 
rhetorical arguments. First, while continuing to facially recognize that 
certain racial classifications might be justified by compelling circumstances, 
by the mid-1990s the Court spoke far more often in terms of the inherent 
harms of government uses of race.175 Thus, the majority decisions for the 
Court during this time period began to refer to all racial classifications—
including those intended to benefit racial minorities—in broadly negative 
terms, characterizing such classifications as “pernicious,” “odious,” and 
“stigmatiz[ing].”176 While continuing to pay lip service to the notion that 
strict scrutiny was intended to “smoke out” invidious uses of race, the Court 
in fact turned toward an understanding in which government uses of race 
may be justified by compelling objectives, but are always fundamentally 
non-benign.177 This rhetorical turn, which would take on an even more 
strident form in some of the later opinions authored by the Court’s race 
conservatives, provided the Court with its fundamental normative justifica-
tion for treating affirmative action as constitutionally akin to invidious uses 
of race.178  
 
174 For news articles discussing the significance of Adarand and Croson, see Joan Biskupic, 
Court’s Conservatives Make Presence Felt: Reagan Appointees Lead Move Rightward, WASH. POST, 
July 2, 1995, at A1 (describing the Court’s decision in Adarand and other 1994 Term decisions as 
“finally deliver[ing]” on Ronald Reagan’s anti-affirmative action agenda and “set[ting] in motion a 
rollback of federal affirmative action programs”); Linda Greenhouse, Court Bars a Plan Set Up to 
Provide Jobs to Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1989, at A1 (describing how the Croson ruling “cast 
constitutional doubt on a wide variety of government hiring and contract programs to aid 
minorities”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rulings Herald Rehnquist Era, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 
1995, at A1 (stating that the Adarand ruling “puts in jeopardy every federal program that explicitly 
uses race as a criterion for awarding contracts or jobs”). 
175 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, 229, 236 (characterizing race-based distinctions as 
“odious” and “inherently suspect” (citations omitted)); id. at 240-41 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in judgment) (“[T]here can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended 
consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination.”); Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993) (“Classifications of citizens solely on the basis of race ‘are by their 
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’” 
(citations omitted)); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94, 500 (“Classifications based on race carry a danger 
of stigmatic harm.”); id. at 521, 527-28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing the view that all racial 
classifications are inherently malign). 
176 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-24, 229, 236 (citations omitted); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643. 
177 But see Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (reiterating that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke 
out” invidious uses of race). 
178 See supra notes 175-77; see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 
(PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 721, 745-48 (2007) (drawing on Brown to argue that public school policies 
intended to promote integration were constitutionally impermissible, and characterizing the use of 
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The Court buttressed these normative claims of inherent invidiousness 
with related claims of “consistency” (i.e., claims that the Court must treat 
all racial classifications the same).179 “[A]ll racial classifications,” the Court 
increasingly claimed, “must be strictly scrutinized” by the courts.180 In other 
words, racial classifications of any kind “are constitutional only if they are 
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.”181 
Thus, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Court turned away from the notion of 
contextual variability toward a claim of global consistency, requiring the 
most stringent form of scrutiny for all government uses of race.182 And 
although this rhetorical theme emerged primarily as a normative explana-
tion for why the claims of white plaintiffs should be treated the same as the 
claims of racial minorities, it would ultimately evolve into a broad descrip-
tive claim and doctrinal mandate to which the Court itself would claim 
adherence.183 
Both of these core justifications for the Court’s increasingly stringent review 
of affirmative action programs—inherent invidiousness and cross-contextual 
consistency—arguably should have had profound implications for the use of 
race in family law. For although, in the aftermath of Palmore, the lower 
courts did largely cease to award custody modifications based on interracial 
marriages;184 they typically construed Palmore as having relatively little 
importance for other ongoing uses of race.185  
 
racial classifications as “odious,” “promot[ing] ‘notions of racial inferiority,’” “contributing to an 
escalation of racial hostility and conflict,” and “demean[ing to] the dignity and worth of a person” 
(citations omitted)); id. at 751-52, 758, 778-82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (comparing the dissent’s 
arguments in favor of the consideration of race as a means of promoting integration to the 
segregationist states’ arguments in Brown and to the “elite[]” racial theories at issue in Dred Scott 
and Plessy); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[E]very time the government places citizens on racial registers and makes 
race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it demeans us all.”). 
179 See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224; see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643. 
180 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added). 
181 Id. at 227. 
182 See id. at 224, 227; see also Shaw, 509 U.S. at 643. 
183 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224, 227; see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 
2417-19 (2013); PICS, 551 U.S. at 720, 739 n.16, 741-42; id. at 751-52, 758-59, 778-82 (Thomas, J., 
concurring); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270. 
184 See, e.g., Turman v. Boleman, 510 S.E.2d 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding a child custody 
decree that prohibited the child’s contact with African American males void, and barring the 
husband from withholding visitation to the mother based on her marriage to an African American 
man); Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1987) (holding that the impact of a mother’s 
subsequent biracial marriage is an inappropriate basis for custody modification); Elliott v. Boyes, 
13 Phila. 273, 283, 283 n.5 (Phil. Cnty. Ct. 1985) (finding stepfather’s race irrelevant where there 
was no evidence that his race had adversely affected the children); see also KENNEDY, supra note 7, 
at 385-86. But cf. Dansby v. Dansby, 189 S.W.3d 473 (Ark Ct. App. 2004) (disapproving of the trial 
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As a result, Palmore did not eradicate the continuing use of race in adop-
tion and foster care, nor in custody disputes between interracial parents. 
Instead, the continued use of race in those contexts was largely deemed 
acceptable by the courts, except where the facts evidenced an exclusive 
reliance on racial criteria (a limitation with which only the most unsophisti-
cated government actor would be unable to demonstrate compliance). 
Indeed, courts addressing post-Palmore, race-based family law practices 
typically found them to be categorically constitutional (i.e., requiring no 
constitutional scrutiny of any kind) where race was not the exclusive factor 
considered as part of the best interest of the child assessment. 
This approach, while perhaps consistent with a narrow reading of Palmore, 
was in obvious tension with the Court’s post-Palmore affirmative action 
 
court’s reliance on the race of the mother’s partner in awarding change of custody, but nevertheless 
affirming on other grounds). 
185 See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990) 
(declining to read Palmore as a broad proscription against the consideration of race in matters of 
child custody and foster care placement); Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1994) 
(holding that “[i]t appears well-settled in the case law” that race can be a factor in child placement 
so long as it is not the only factor); In re Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316 (D.C. 1985) (declining to 
intrude “into the trial court’s exercise of discretion in inter-racial adoption cases” because in such 
cases, “there is no need to reach the constitutional issue of equal protection”); Gloria G. v. State 
Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979 (Kan. 1992) (finding that race could be used as a 
factor in adoption decisions so long as it is not the sole factor); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 
2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1047-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (finding that the use of race as a factor 
was constitutionally permissible, but that exclusive reliance on race was not; but also finding no 
error in rejecting prospective adoptive parents’ claims, despite lower court finding that race was 
the “sole criterion”); Carlson v. County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453, 455, 458 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023 (1989) (holding that qualified immunity barred a claim in a case 
where a white couple was told that it was “against county policy to allow a white couple to adopt a 
black child”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 27a-28a, In re Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 
(Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992) (No. 92-616) (reproducing lower court decision, 
which had concluded that Minnesota’s race-matching statute was “likely not subject to . . . strict 
scrutiny” “[s]ince it addresses substantial problems arising out of the realities that Minnesota is 
more than 90% white” and was designed to “ensure the best interests of children are met by 
requiring due consideration of the child’s minority race”); Memorandum from J.B. on No. 90-123-
CSX, Wilson v. Darrow, to the Cert Pool 1-4 (Aug. 10, 1990) (on file with the Blackmun Digital 
Archive) (noting, in a certiorari memorandum describing the lower courts’ decisions, that the 
lower courts had found that although exclusive reliance on race was impermissible, race as a factor 
was constitutional, and that this was consistent with the consensus of the courts of appeals). But cf. 
McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (granting a preliminary injunction and 
finding that the removal of a foster child violates equal protection where race was the sole basis for 
the removal), aff ’d on other grounds, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Marriage of Brown, 480 
N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the notion that race could be a factor in a 
custody dispute based on Palmore); In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) 
(requiring strict scrutiny where race was the sole factor in adoption determination). See generally 
Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IOWA L. REV. 145, 169-70 (1994) (observing, similarly, that Palmore did 
not eradicate the use of race in family law). 
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doctrine.186 Both of the Court’s key justifications for its new affirmative 
action doctrine—the inherent invidiousness of all uses of race and the need 
for consistency across all race-based decisionmaking contexts—facially 
demanded the application of strict scrutiny to all government uses of race,187 
even where race was not the exclusive consideration.188 And indeed, many of 
the race-based family law decisions that courts confronted during this time 
gave, either formally or de facto, at least as much weight to racial considera-
tions as the affirmative action policies that the Court had found to require 
strict scrutiny (with predictable results for their constitutional validity).189  
Thus, the Court’s affirmative action precedents during this time frame 
should have profoundly unsettled the lower courts’ approach to the remain-
ing instantiations of race in family law (adoption, foster care, and interracial 
parent custody disputes). But while 1985 to 1995 was a time of considerable 
change for race in family law doctrine (like affirmative action), this change 
was not in the direction one would expect. Between 1985 and 1995, rather 
than moving toward a consensus against the use of race in family law, the 
lower courts increasingly expressed a consensus that remaining uses of race 
 
186 As discussed, Palmore was written narrowly by Chief Justice Burger precisely to leave 
open the possibility of using race as a factor in future family law cases. See supra notes 135, 168-69 
and accompanying text.  
187 All of these race-based family law cases involved state action, as defined for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes, in the form of race-based action by a state agency, race-based adjudication, 
or a state statute mandating the application of race-based criteria. I am aware of no case in which 
the absence of state action was the basis for rejecting the litigant’s equal protection arguments. 
188 The view that even using race as a factor requires strict scrutiny was articulated in the 
affirmative action context by a number of the Court’s race conservatives as early as Bakke (in 
internal memoranda) and was ultimately codified explicitly by the Court in its affirmative action 
case law. See, e.g., Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist on No. 76-811, Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, to the Conference 1-4 (Jan. 3, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry 
A. Blackmun Papers) (expressing the view in that in the affirmative action context, even use of 
race as a factor demanded strict scrutiny); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (affirming strict scrutiny 
as the appropriate standard for a case involving a “race as a factor” admissions process); cf. Mt. 
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (recognizing that, even 
where an unconstitutional consideration is merely one factor, it is constitutionally problematic if it 
is the dispositive factor). 
189 Compare J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 242-43 (affirming the dismissal of claims relating to the re-
moval of African American children from a foster home pursuant to a policy requiring placement 
of minority children with families of “similar racial and ethnic characteristics”) and Reisman v. 
Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 365 (W.D. Tenn. 1993) (addressing the issue of 
race-matching in foster care and adoption and ordering categorically that “bi-racial children shall 
be placed in foster homes and in adoptive homes with bi-racial families, if possible”), with 
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 205-09, 235-37 (applying strict scrutiny to a program in which race was one 
factor, but not the only consideration) and Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 270-73, 
283-84 (1986) (invalidating a layoff policy in which race and seniority were both considerations 
with four Justices endorsing the application of strict scrutiny). 
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in the family were constitutionally permissible.190 And while the courts were 
never completely unified, either in outcome or in approach, by the 1990s, 
most courts were expressing the view that only de minimis (if any) constitu-
tional scrutiny was demanded of race-based family law practices, at least 
where race was not the exclusive consideration.191 As such, the decade 
between 1985 and 1995—unlike the preceding decade—was marked by 
increasing consistency in both the outcome and the reasoning of the courts’ 
approaches to government uses of race in the family; but in ways that 
diverged profoundly from both the framework adopted (strict scrutiny) and 
the usual results (invalidation) in the affirmative action context during the 
same time frame. 
Five of the disputes arising during this time frame—all involving race-
based adoption or foster care determinations—prompted the litigants 
involved to seek Supreme Court intervention in these continuing race-based 
family law practices. First in 1988 and then again in 1989, 1990, 1992, and 
1994, disappointed would-be parents petitioned the Court to address state 
policies and practices that had resulted in the removal of African American 
 
190 See, e.g., J.H.H., 878 F.2d 240; Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Mich. 1994); 
DeWees v. Stevenson, 779 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Pa. 1991); In re Petition of D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316 
(D.C. 1985); Gloria G., 833 P.2d 979; Wilson v. Darrow (Ky. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 
851 (1990); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); In re 
Welfare of D.L., 486 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992); Carlson v. 
County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); cf. Reisman, 843 F. Supp. at 363-66 
(finding a violation of equal protection where an agency race-matched biracial children with black 
parents, but ordering instead that “bi-racial children shall be placed in foster homes and in 
adoptive homes with bi-racial families”—i.e., that they should be even more specifically race-
matched); Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954, at *7-8 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 
28, 1992) (stating that it is “by no means clear” that race-matching in adoption is constitutionally 
impermissible, but basing holding on abstention grounds); Lee v. Halayko, 590 N.Y.S.2d 647 
(App. Div. 1992) (stating that the use of race in custody disputes between interracial parents is 
generally appropriate, but finding that here it did not tip the balance in favor of the minority 
parent); In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (disapproving the use of race as a 
sole consideration in adoption, but approving its use generally). See generally Rhonda Hillbery, 
“Baby D” Foster Parents in Court Again—Judge Reverses Decision to Allow Adoption of Black Child, 
STAR TRIB., Sept. 6, 1994, at 1A (describing an adoption case in which the judge reversed a prior 
decision granting a private adoption based on a state race-matching statute). 
191 See, e.g., Tallman, 859 F. Supp. at 1085-88; In re D.I.S., 494 A.2d at 1326-27; Wilson (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1989); In re D.L., 486 N.W.3d at 375; cf. DeWees, 779 F. Supp. at 26-29 (approving race-
matching based on common-sense norms, but nominally applying strict scrutiny); McLaughlin v. 
Pernsley, 693 F. Supp. 318, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (applying rigorous constitutional scrutiny where 
race was the sole factor considered), aff ’d on other grounds, 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989); In re 
Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d at 785-88 (same). But cf. In re Marriage of Brown, 480 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (applying meaningful constitutional scrutiny to an interracial child custody 
dispute, even though race was not the sole consideration).  
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or biracial children from their homes.192 Arguing that the courts below had 
carved out an exception for state-sponsored “segregation” in the family, the 
litigants in each case contended that the lower courts had lost touch with 
the Court’s broader race law jurisprudence.193 Often drawing explicitly on 
the Court’s affirmative action precedents, they called upon the Court to 
remedy the lower courts’ aberrational approach and to strike down the 
continuing use of race in the adoption and foster care contexts.194 
But the Court showed no more interest in taking up the issues of adop-
tion or foster care during the 1985 to 1995 time frame than it had at the time 
that Palmore was decided. While the record of the Justices’ personal views of 
the cases that came up to the Court during this time is sparse, none of the 
five cases appears to have been perceived as a serious candidate for review. 
Indeed, in most of the cases for which internal Court records are available, 
 
192 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4-8, J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990) (No. 89-
906) [hereinafter J.H.H. Petition] (arguing that review should be granted of a race-based foster-
care determination due to its inconsistency with the Courts’ race law precedents); Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari at *11-13, Wilson v. Darrow, 498 U.S. 851 (1990) (No. 90-123) [hereinafter Wilson 
Petition] (arguing that the defendant’s “automatic, race-based exclusion of prospective adoptive 
parents” lacked the “extraordinary justification” required by the Court’s race law precedents); 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, Mauk v. Engle, 516 U.S. 809 (1995) (No. 94-1876) [hereinafter 
Mauk Petition] (asserting that race-based removal of an African American foster child from the 
care of white foster parents violated the Equal Protection Clause); Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at *13-17, Sharp v. Hennepin County, 506 U.S. 1000 (1992) (No. 92-616) [hereinafter Sharp 
Petition] (arguing that review should be granted to “reaffirm the Constitutional proscription 
against racial segregation” in the context of race-matching in adoption); see also Memorandum 
from M.S. on No. 88-6265-CSX, Carlson v. County of Hennepin, to the Cert Pool at 9-10 (1989) 
[hereinafter Carlson Memo] (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive) (describing the Carlson 
Petition, which sought certiorari review of an adoption decision based on Minnesota’s race-
matching statute).  
193 J.H.H. Petition, supra note 192, at 4-5; Wilson Petition, supra note 192, at 11-15; Sharp Peti-
tion, supra note 192, at 10, 13-18 (describing the County defendant as having encouraged “racial 
segregation” in removing a black foster child pursuant to Minnesota Minority Heritage Child 
Protection Act); Mauk Petition, supra note 192, at 12-24; see also Carlson Memo, supra note 192, at 9-
10. 
194 See, e.g., Mauk Petition, supra note 192, at 12-24 (drawing, inter alia, on affirmative action 
case law to call for the Court to intervene and address the lower courts’ approach to race family 
law issues); Sharp Petition, supra note 192, at 13-18 (arguing that the Court should take up the issue 
of race-matching in adoption since the “race-based decisionmaking of the courts throughout the 
country is in conflict with this Court’s fundamental rulings”); J.H.H. Petition, supra note 192, at 4-
5 (arguing that the Court should grant certiorari to “lay to rest the sinister suggestion raised in 
this case that state sponsored racial segregation may somehow be countenanced in a democratic 
society”); Wilson Petition, supra note 192, at 11-15 (drawing on affirmative action case law in arguing 
that the Court should intervene and address the issue of race-matching in adoption); see also Brief 
of Respondent in Support of Petition at 6-16, J.H.H., 493 U.S. 1072 (No. 89-906) (same); Carlson 
Memo, supra note 192, at 9-10 (summarizing the Petitioners’ arguments that Carlson County 
“practices impermissible racial discrimination . . . that the state c[ou]rts have condoned this 
practice[,] . . . and that it will continue unless this C[our]t acts by granting this pet[itio]n”). 
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those records suggest that the case at issue never even made it to the 
Justices’ so-called “discuss list,” signifying that not a single Justice thought 
discussion of the case was warranted as a potential matter for the Court to 
take up.195 And while several of the cases arguably had procedural complica-
tions that made them unappealing candidates for certiorari, at least one was, 
in the words of Justice Blackmun’s law clerk, “extraordinary,” involving a 
lower court decision that had denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to 
demonstrate that even the sole use of race to deny a foster care placement 
violated their clearly established constitutional rights.196 Nevertheless, even 
this “extraordinary” case appears not to have attracted any serious attention, 
and ultimately each of the cases would be denied certiorari review. 
IV. ADARAND TO GAMBLA: 1996–2007 
While the Court thus declined during the post-Palmore period to be-
come involved in the ongoing constitutional disputes over the propriety of 
the use of race in adoption and foster care, statutory changes in the mid-
1990s would ultimately limit the practical significance of this inaction. In 
1994, Congress enacted (and shortly thereafter amended) the Howard M. 
Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994 (MEPA).197 In its final 
form (adopted in 1996), MEPA precluded the use of race as a basis for 
“delay[ing]” or “deny[ing]” foster care or adoption placements by most state 
 
195 See Docket Sheet, No. 92-616, Sharp v. Hennepin County (on file with the Library of 
Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (showing no individual vote on Sharp); Docket Sheet, No. 
90-123, Wilson v. Darrow (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive) (showing no individual vote 
on Wilson); Docket Sheet, No. 89-906, J.H.H. v. O’Hara (on file with the Library of Congress, 
Thurgood Marshall Papers) (showing no individual vote on J.H.H.); Docket Sheet, No. 88-6265, 
Carlson v. County of Hennepin (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive) (showing no votes in 
favor of granting certiorari in Carlson). See generally Songying Fang, Timothy R. Johnson & Jason 
M. Roberts, The Will of the Minority: The Rule of Four on the United States Supreme Court 18 
(Oct. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.owlnet.rice.edu/~sf5/Fang/ 
Assistant_Professor_files/rule4_fa07_fang.pdf (noting that only those cases that are on the discuss 
list are voted on at conference).  
196 Annotation of M.S. on Memorandum from S.C., Law Clerk, on No. 89-906-CFX, 
J.H.H. v. O’Hara, to the Cert Pool 8 (Jan. 25, 1990) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry 
A. Blackmun Papers); see also J.H.H., 878 F.2d at 243 (noting that the determination in J.H.H. was 
made pursuant to a policy that “[m]inority children shall be placed with families of similar racial 
and ethnic characteristics”).  
197 Pub. L. 103-382 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994)) (prior to 1996 amendment); see also 
Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 32-34 (2008) (discussing the history behind 
MEPA). 
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actors, thus achieving by statute much of what litigants had long sought 
(unsuccessfully) to institutionalize as a matter of constitutional law.198  
Federal enforcement efforts were reportedly weak, and noncompliance 
rampant, in the initial time frame after MEPA’s enactment. But by the 
mid-to-late 2000s, it appears that MEPA had wrought real, albeit not 
universal, changes in state adoption and foster care practices.199 Indeed, a 
number of states that had statutes explicitly requiring race-matching in 
adoption or foster care modified their statutory law following MEPA to, at 
least ostensibly, preclude such practices.200 As a result, by the mid-2000s it 
had become significantly more rare for public institutions (and courts) to 
rely explicitly on race in adoption or foster care determinations, a decline 
that is reflected in the case law.201 
 
198 Maldonado, supra note 197, at 32-34; see also 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(18) (2006 & Supp. V 
2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1996b(1) (1996). Section 671(a)(18) explicitly applies only to those states and 
entities receiving federal funds. Section 1996b(1) is written in ostensibly categorical terms, but 
provides for enforcement only via Title VI, a spending clause statute. Since the overwhelming 
majority of state agencies receive federal funding, see Katie Eyer, Rehabilitation Act Redux, 23 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 282-87 (2005), MEPA’s restrictions thus extend, at a minimum, to the vast 
majority of public agencies, as well as to those private agencies receiving federal funds.  
199 See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Correspondence, Private Race Preferences in Family Formation, 
107 YALE L.J. 2351, 2353-54 (1998) (noting that as of 1998, MEPA had had little effect due to 
deeply entrenched professional preferences for race-matching and weak enforcement); Meyer, 
supra note 11, at 195-207 (describing the Department of Health and Human Services’ new 
aggressive enforcement approach to MEPA). 
200 Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.29 (1991) (requiring placement agencies to place 
minority children in same-race placements, except where a placement with a relative was 
available), with MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.57, 260C.212 (2007) (collectively prohibiting the state 
from “delay[ing]” or “deny[ing]” foster care or adoption placements based on race).  
201 The effects of MEPA can be seen both in the number and the substance of cases brought 
in the post-1995 period. Numerically, adoption cases have become much less common in the case 
law, particularly since the mid-2000s. Substantively, post-MEPA adoption cases increasingly 
involve the refusal of courts or agencies to afford greater weight to race, a claim that is often 
rejected on the basis of MEPA or its state law analogs. See, e.g., In re Malik S., 1999 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 1178, at *16-17 n.5 (May 5, 1999) (recognizing the difficulties “in growing up as a child of 
mixed race living with white parents” but approving the placement on the basis of MEPA and the 
child’s best interests); In re F.W., 870 A.2d 82, 86-87 (D.C. 2005) (“We disagree . . . with . . . [the] 
contention[] that the trial court failed to weigh adequately the issues of race, culture, and gender 
in reaching its determination.”); In re P.S., 797 A.2d 1219, 1225 (D.C. 2001) (concluding that “race 
is simply a factor that may be considered . . . in the process of determining the best interests of the 
child” and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give more weight to the 
child’s race); In re D.T., No. A10-35, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 682, at *8-9 (July 13, 2010) 
(rejecting a challenge to the child’s placement based on religious and cultural needs); In re D.C., 
No. A-1151-05T4, 2006 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2620, at *6-7 (Apr. 25, 2006) (rejecting the 
argument that the child should be placed with a relative that would foster ethnic, racial, or cultural 
identity and noting that “the race of the foster/adoptive parents is not and cannot be a disqualify-
ing factor” under MEPA); In re Maximus H., No. B-07428-07, 2009 N.Y. LEXIS 3371, *3-5 (Fam. 
Ct. Dec. 10, 2009) (considering matters of racial and cultural identity but refusing to remove the 
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MEPA’s changes, however, were explicitly limited to the adoption and 
foster care context and did not reach the courts’ continued use of race in 
custody disputes between interracial parents. Such custody disputes—while 
always less common than adoption disputes—had traditionally employed 
very similar reasoning to that used in the adoption and foster care con-
text.202 Thus, the courts had typically permitted the use of race as a disposi-
tive factor in interracial custody disputes (on the grounds that the minority 
parent would be better situated to meet a biracial child’s emotional needs), 
most often without any meaningful constitutional scrutiny.203 Indeed, such 
courts, like courts faced with racial practices in the adoption and foster care 
context, often held that where race was not the exclusive consideration in 
the best interest analysis, no constitutional scrutiny was required at all. That 
reasoning—untouched by MEPA’s statutory changes—continued to evolve 
little in the post-MEPA period, as most courts continued to affirm the 
propriety of weighing race as a factor in interracial custody disputes.204 
 
child from a foster family of another race and religion). But see Ralph Richard Banks, The 
Multiethnic Placement Act and the Troubling Persistence of Race Matching, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 271, 
284-85 (2009) (arguing that some agencies have simply moved to a regime of thinly veiled race-
matching, often under the rubric of “cultural competency”). Since MEPA was amended in 1996, 
only two courts have addressed the constitutionality of relying on race in adoptive or foster care 
placements, with opposite results. Compare In re Andrea Lynn Carpenter, No. 217634, 1999 Mich. 
App. LEXIS 2140, at *8-10 & n.3 (Dec. 3, 1999) (finding the trial court’s reliance on race was 
constitutionally unproblematic where race was not the sole consideration), with Kenny A. v. 
Perdue, No. 02-1686, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27025, at *21-22 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2004) (allowing a 
claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination, in a case where the circumstantial evidence 
supported the conclusion that the agency had a virtually categorical policy of race-matching, to 
survive summary judgment); cf. In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 634-36 (N.D. 2003) (rejecting an 
equal protection challenge to the application of the ICWA to the adoption of Indian children), 
cert. denied, 541 U.S. 972 (2004). 
202 See infra note 203. 
203 See, e.g., Raysor v. Gabbey, 395 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294-95 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that racial 
considerations “should be a matter of first importance in weighing the child’s best interests” in a 
custody dispute between an African American father and white grandparents); Ward v. Ward, 216 
P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950) (“These . . . victims of a mixed marriage . . . will have a much better 
opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up among their own 
people.”). But see Lee v. Halayko, 590 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (App. Div. 1992) (upholding the trial 
court’s decision to place partially Chinese children with the non-Chinese parent on the grounds 
that the non-Chinese parent was sufficiently culturally competent); Farmer v. Farmer, 109 Misc. 
2d 137, 146-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (surveying the case law and concluding that race should be 
weighed as a factor but not a “dominant” or “controlling” one); Tucker v. Tucker, 542 P.2d 789 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (questioning the validity of Ward but nevertheless affirming that race can be 
a factor in custody disputes between interracial parents). Only two cases have ever invalidated the 
use of race in the interracial custody context on constitutional grounds. See In re Marriage of 
Brown, 480 N.E.2d 246 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Beazley v. Davis, 545 P.2d 206, 207-08 (Nev. 1976). 
204 See, e.g., Gambla v. Woodson, 853 N.E.2d 847, 868-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (“[S]o long as 
race is not the sole consideration for custody decisions, but only one of several factors, it is not an 
unconstitutional consideration.”); Ebirim v. Ebirim, 620 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) 
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Thus, while racial factors were not always deemed dispositive in the circum-
stances of a particular case, courts called upon to adjudicate interracial 
custody disputes during this time frame continued to regularly reaffirm the 
legal validity of the use of race to determine a child’s best interests in 
interracial custody disputes. 
Exemplary of this continuing practice and the constitutional disputes 
that it continued to engender, was the Illinois case of Gambla v. Woodson.205 
Filed in 2003 in Illinois Circuit Court, Gambla v. Woodson was the product 
of a brief and unhappy marriage between Christopher Gambla, a white 
man, and Kimberly Woodson, an African American woman.206 At primary 
issue in Gambla and Woodson’s divorce was custody of their one child—a 
biracial baby daughter named Kira—for whom they both claimed to be the 
primary caregiver.207 At trial, Gambla and Woodson would each introduce 
an abundance of evidence in support of their custody claims, with four 
experts and ten lay witnesses testifying over the course of the seventeen-day 
trial.208 Race played an important role in the trial, with Woodson introduc-
ing expert testimony that Kira—as a biracial child—would be better served 
by an award of custody to her African American mother.209  
Despite this evidence—and the fact that many courts in similar circum-
stances had awarded custody to the minority parent—Christopher had 
reason to be optimistic that race would not play a meaningful role in the 
determination of Kira’s custody. Historically, Illinois had not been a solici-
tous jurisdiction for race-based family law decisionmaking, frequently 
abandoning or limiting race-based family law rules long before other 
jurisdictions did.210 Indeed, the Illinois Court of Appeals was the first court 
in the country to invalidate a trial court’s race-based award of custody in a 
dispute between interracial parents, finding in 1956 that an automatic 
 
(“consider[ing] the impact of [the child’s] biracial heritage in light of all the relevant factors”); 
Savage v. Cota, 885 N.Y.S.2d 798, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (“We reject the . . . contention that 
the court relied too heavily on the child’s race in determining . . . custody.”); In re Davis, 658 
N.Y.S.2d 548, 550 (App. Div. 1997) (making clear that race can be considered as a factor, but 
finding it was not dispositive in the case under review); Olivier A. v. Christina A., No. 3077912002 
(Sup. Ct. Aug. 2005) (considering race as a factor, but finding it nondispositive). 
205 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847.  
206 Id. at 849. 
207 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at app. 63a, 130a-32a, Gambla v. Woodson, 552 U.S. 1056 
(2007) (No. 06-1193) (trial court opinion and expert report of Daniel J. Hynan, Ph.D.). 
208 Id. at app. 63a (trial court opinion). 
209 Id. at app. 68a. 
210 See infra notes 211-12. Illinois also repealed its antimiscegenation law in 1874, long before 
most other states had done so. Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: 
Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-Sex Marriage, 51 HOW. L.J. 117, 180 app. III (2007).  
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race-based award to the minority parent was impermissible.211 And while 
the Illinois courts had not, in the years since, issued a published decision 
addressing the use of race to determine custody between interracial parents, 
they had, in other contexts, repeatedly rejected lower court attempts to 
inject race into family law decisionmaking.212 Thus, while Illinois law 
arguably allowed the use of race as a factor in custody disputes (so long as it 
was not dispositive), in practice, custody decisions resting on racial grounds 
were rarely upheld.213 
Moreover, in Kira’s case, it seemed that all factors other than race pointed 
toward an award of custody to Christopher.214 Both of the custody experts 
who had evaluated the family, including Kimberly’s own, voiced strong 
opinions at trial that custody should be awarded to Christopher.215 Relying 
in part on psychological testing and in part on Kimberly’s history of physi-
cal aggression in intimate relationships, both expressed concerns that 
 
211 Fountaine v. Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532, 533-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956). For a case illustrative 
of other courts’ approaches to this issue during the same time frame, see, for example, Ward v. 
Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 756 (Wash. 1950), which held that biracial children should be raised by their 
African American grandmother, rather than their white mother because “[t]hey will have a much 
better opportunity to take their rightful place in society if they are brought up among their own 
people.” 
212 See, e.g., Langin v. Langin, 276 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (reversing the trial court’s 
custody decision for relying too heavily on the factor of race); Stingley v. Wesch, 222 N.E.2d 505, 
507 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966) (finding that race should not be decisive in a custody dispute and that the 
stepfather’s race had no significance in the proceeding). 
213 But see Russell v. Russell, 399 N.E.2d 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (affirming the decision of a 
trial court that had relied in part on the possibility of social stigmitazation as a result of the 
mother’s interracial marriage, because its partial reliance did not overweigh other considerations 
and was not decisive). 
214 Aside from race, the factors that the trial court explicitly referenced were all found to 
either be equal, or weigh in favor of Christopher. From a practical perspective, however, it is 
certainly possible that Christopher’s sex (i.e., status as a father), also played a role, albeit a silent 
one in the court’s decisionmaking. See, e.g., Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: 
Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 967-75 (2005) (discussing the 
possibility that fathers continue to be disadvantaged by informal social norms in custody disputes 
despite the abolition of the tender years doctrine, but concluding that the evidence is mixed); 
Steven N. Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an 
Imperfect But Necessary Guidepost to Determine Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449, 465 & nn. 
73 & 74 (2005) (noting that Illinois abolished its tender years doctrine as a violation of its state 
Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s). 
215 See Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 851-54, 860-61 (outlining the evaluators’ reasons for recom-
mending that Christopher receive custody); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 
126a-64a (expert reports of Daniel J. Hynan, Ph.D., and Robert P. Hatcher, Ph.D.); see also 
Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 872 (Byrne, J., concurring) (noting that Woodson selected one of the two 
experts who testified that custody should be awarded to Gambla). 
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Kimberly suffered from impulsivity and self-control problems.216 Both 
experts also suggested that Kimberly—who embraced alternative medicine 
approaches without scientific support and who had arguably ignored the 
seriousness of her older son’s mental health problems—appeared to lack 
judgment when it came to her children’s medical care.217 Finally, the experts 
noted that Christopher was more likely to encourage continued contact with 
the noncustodial parent, an important consideration under Illinois custody 
law.218 Thus, while noting that Kimberly was also a loving and competent 
parent, both of the formal custody evaluators recommended an award of 
custody to Christopher.219 
In contrast, neither of the two experts introduced by Kimberly at trial 
had met with Kira or Christopher (and indeed in one instance had not met 
with Kimberly herself) and neither had been approved as a custody expert 
by the court.220 Thus, both of Kimberly’s experts restricted their testimony 
primarily to critiquing certain methodological defects in the reports of the 
two formal custody evaluators.221 Specifically, both of Kimberly’s experts 
questioned the inferences that the Drs. Hynan and Hatcher had drawn from 
Kimberly’s psychological testing, contending that those inferences were 
culturally biased and lacked context.222 Finally, despite not being qualified 
to do so, both of Kimberly’s experts testified that because Kira was biracial, 
she would be best served by being placed with Kimberly, the minority 
parent.223 As described by the trial court, both experts “seemed to be 
testifying for the proposition that solely because [Kimberly] is African 
 
216 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 134a, 136a, 146a, 155a (reproducing 
Dr. Hynan’s and Dr. Hatcher’s reports, and reflecting that both expressed concerns about 
Kimberly’s impulsivity and self-control in view of the testing profile observed by Dr. Hynan). 
217 Id. at app. 145a-146a, 163a.  
218 Id. at app. 148a, 163a.  
219 Id. at app. 143a, 163a. 
220 Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 857-59 (noting that the trial court only found Drs. Thomas and 
Alexander qualified to opine on the custody evaluators’ methods); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 207, at app. 165a, 175a (expert reports of Anita Thomas, Ph.D., and Charles L. 
Alexander, Psy.D.) (showing that neither of the experts that testified for Kimberly had met with 
Kira and Christopher and that one had not met with Kimberly herself).  
221 See Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 858-59 (summarizing Dr. Thomas’s and Dr. Alexander’s trial 
testimony and showing that it focused primarily on critiquing methodological defects in Dr. 
Hynan’s and Dr. Hatcher’s approaches); see also id. at 875 (McLaren, J., dissenting) (dismissing 
Drs. Thomas’s and Alexander’s testimony as merely “inaccurate comments that [the custody 
evaluators] should have considered the race and circumstances of the parties when they conducted 
their tests”). 
222 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 165a, 175a.  
223 Id. at app. 68a-69a (trial court opinion). 
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American and because Kira is a biracial child, her custody should be awarded 
to [Kimberly].”224  
The trial court—while claiming to reject this “broad stroke” approach—
would nevertheless itself find race to be dispositive of Kira’s best interest.225 
After finding the parties equally deserving of custody under each of the 
statutory factors set out in Illinois’s Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act,226 and rejecting each of the bases articulated by the custody evaluators 
for awarding custody to Christopher, the court noted that Kimberly, as a 
black woman, “will be able . . . to provide Kira with a breadth of cultural 
knowledge and experience that [Christopher] will not be able to do.”227 
Based on this “special circumstance[],” the court concluded that Kimberly 
would be better able “to provide for the emotional needs of [Kira]” and 
awarded sole custody to Kimberly.228  
On appeal, Christopher—by then proceeding pro se—argued to the Illi-
nois Court of Appeals that this race-based decision was erroneous on both 
factual and legal grounds.229 But the court would reject each of Christo-
pher’s claims, finding as to the race issue that both Illinois law and federal 
constitutional doctrine permitted the use of race in a custody award.230 
Thus, the court concluded that the trial court’s decision, which also men-
tioned factors other than race (albeit none that it suggested might be 
dispositive), did not run afoul of constitutional or common law custody 
strictures.231 One justice dissented, contending, inter alia, that the trial 
court’s use of race had been constitutionally impermissible.232 
The Illinois Supreme Court denied review of the Illinois Court of Appeals 
decision on November 29, 2006.233 Thus, on February 27, 2007, Christopher 
 
224 Id. at app. 68a. 
225 Id. at app. 68a-69a. 
226 For example, although Kira had a sibling in Kimberly’s custody, the court found that the 
statutory factor of “interrelationship of the child with her parents, her siblings and any other 
persons who may significantly affect her best interests” weighed evenly in favor of both parties 
because Kira had a close and loving relationship with the relatives who lived with her father. Id. at 
app. 66a. 
227 Id. at app. 68a-69a; see also Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 873-76 (McLaren, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the trial court’s award of custody was based solely on race, and that the court erred in not 
accepting the qualified experts’ recommendations).  
228 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 69a. 
229 See generally Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847. 
230 Id. at 868-70. 
231 See id. (finding that the trial court’s multifactor analysis did not even require substantive 
constitutional scrutiny); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207, at app. 63a-72a 
(making clear that the trial court considered the parties to be equally situated vis-à-vis all factors 
other than race).  
232 See Gambla, 853 N.E.2d at 872-78 (McLaren, J., dissenting). 
233 Gambla v. Woodson, 861 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. 2006). 
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Gambla sought certiorari review from the United States Supreme Court.234 
Focusing principally on Palmore v. Sidoti, Gambla’s pro se petition argued 
that Palmore precluded precisely the type of dispositive reliance on race that 
had occurred in his case.235 If Palmore was to mean anything, Gambla 
contended, it must mean at least that “race cannot be the basis for the 
decision.”236 Moreover, he asserted, there was a conflict among the lower 
courts regarding Palmore’s reach, further justifying a grant of certiorari.237 
The odds for Gambla’s petition—while well-written and sophisticated 
for a pro se submission—did not, a priori, look good. The Court very rarely 
grants pro se petitions of any kind, and the few such petitions that the 
Court does grant typically come from the in forma pauperis, or unpaid, 
docket, of which Gambla was not a part.238 Nevertheless, two months after 
Gambla filed his petition, the Court requested a response from Woodson’s 
attorney.239 Such a “call for a response,” while by no means dispositive of a 
grant of certiorari, does represent a significant improvement in a litigant’s 
odds of receiving such a grant.240 The Court does not grant certiorari 
without a response on file, and will only call for a response when at least 
one Justice believes a grant might be warranted.241 Therefore, the Court’s 
call for a response signals that a case has a better than average chance of 
being awarded review.  
And indeed, it is not difficult to see why one or more of the Justices 
thought that review might be warranted in Gambla’s case. At the time 
Gambla submitted his petition, the Court was in the final stages of deciding 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 (PICS), 
one of the most significant and controversial cases to deal with “benign” 
racial classifications during recent decades.242 Involving the use of race to 
achieve integrated schools at the elementary and secondary school level, 
 
234 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 207. 
235 Id. at 13-15. 
236 Id. at 15. 
237 Id. at 16-19. 
238 Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Pro Se Petitions for Certiorari, 
63 ALB. L. REV. 381, 383-84 & n.6 (1999) (reviewing data regarding the Supreme Court’s 
infrequent grants of certiorari to pro se petitioners). 
239 Docket, No. 06-1193, Gambla v. Woodson, available athttp://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/06-1193.htm (last updated Nov. 2, 2007). 
240 David C. Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certi-
orari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for Views of the Solicitor General, 16 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 237, 244 (2009) (“[A] petition [for certiorari] is 9 times more likely to be granted 
once the Court calls for a response.”). 
241 Id. at 242. 
242 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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PICS was widely perceived by both supporters and opponents as a signifi-
cant opportunity for the Court to further limit benign uses of race.243  
In fact the Court would—when it issued the PICS opinion in late June 
2007—reaffirm the necessity of strictly scrutinizing all uses of race, while 
even more closely cabining the circumstances in which individual racial 
classifications are allowed.244 And although the majority in PICS did not 
speak with a wholly unified voice, with Justice Kennedy chiding his con-
servative colleagues for their simplistic endorsement of colorblindness in 
law, even Kennedy’s own concerns—which centered primarily on the 
individual and community harms from treating an individual differently on 
the basis of race—seemed equally implicated by the use of race at issue in 
Gambla.245 Thus, Gambla—which categorically affirmed the constitutionality 
of using race to deprive a nonminority parent of custody, so long as race was 
not the exclusive factor—presented an obvious tension with the approach of 
the soon-to-be issued decision in PICS. 
Nevertheless, Gambla would not be one of the cases for which a call for a 
response is a precursor to a grant of full review. On October 1, 2007, after 
the Court’s return from its summer recess, the Court would deny Gambla’s 
petition for certiorari.246 Gambla’s petition for rehearing—filed shortly 
thereafter—would also be denied, bringing his four-year custody battle to 
an end.247  
 
243 See, e.g., High Court to Rule on Racial Quotas, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 6, 2006, at 6B 
(noting that “[c]ourt watchers believe the acceptance of the case shows the court under new Chief 
Justice John Roberts intends to wade in and clear up the confusing legal status of ‘affirmative 
action’”); Linda Greenhouse, Court Reviews Race as a Factor in School Plans, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 
2006, at A1 (“At its most profound, the debate among the justices was over whether measures 
designed to maintain or achieve integration should be subjected to the same harsh scrutiny to 
which Brown v. Board of Education subjected the regime of official segregation. In the view of the 
conservative majority, the answer is yes.”); Editorial, The High Court, Race and Education, WASH. 
TIMES, June 7, 2006, at A20 (citing the retirement of Justice O’Connor—who provided the swing 
vote in Grutter v. Bollinger—as an opportunity for the court to change “the race-based admissions 
policies that it enshrined in 2003”); David G. Savage, Barring Choice Based on Race Threatens Civil 
Rights, Some Say, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 5, 2006, at A3 (noting that “[t]he Supreme 
Court justices, hearing arguments on school integration, signaled Monday that they are likely to 
bar the use of race when assigning students to public schools,” and opining that this “would be a 
major victory for those who have called for ‘color-blind’ decision-making by public officials”). 
244 See PICS, 551 U.S. at 720-25, 733-35; see also id. at 725-33, 735-48 (plurality opinion); id. at 
748-82 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing even more strongly for tightly circumscribing the use of 
race).  
245 See PICS, 551 U.S. at 795-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (articulating concerns that racial 
classifications are “divisive” and can lead to a “corrosive discourse”). 
246 Gambla v. Woodson, 552 U.S. 810 (2007). 
247 Petition for Rehearing, Gambla, 552 U.S. 810 (No. 06-1193), pet. denied, 552 U.S. 1056 
(2007). 
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V. POSTSCRIPT: THE 2012 TERM 
On January 4, 2013—thirty-five years after Bakke and Drummond—the 
Court would once again face the question it had faced in Drummond: 
whether to take up an adoption case in the same term as a major affirmative 
action decision.248 Just as thirty-five years ago, Bakke—by then fully briefed 
and argued—provided the backdrop to the Court’s consideration of whether 
to grant review in Drummond, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin—the 
Court’s first major affirmative action case in nearly a decade—was fully 
argued and awaiting decision when the Court met to decide whether to 
grant review for this new adoption case.249 
The facts of the new adoption case also bore striking similarities to the 
Drummonds’ own circumstances in 1978. Like Drummond, the petitioners in 
the pending case had raised a child essentially from birth, only to see the 
child removed from their home as a toddler.250 And, like Drummond, the 
facts left little doubt that the child’s heritage played a key role in the 
removal (although here at issue was a federal law preferencing Indian 
parents for Indian children, not a state race-matching policy).251 In both 
cases, the prospective adoptive parents were undisputedly loving and 
competent parents, with deep attachments to the child removed from their 
home.252 
But this new case—Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl—was also fundamentally 
distinct from Drummond in critical respects.253 Unlike in Drummond, the 
 
248 See Docket, No. 12-399, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, available at http:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-399.htm (last updated July 5, 2013); 
see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012); 
Docket, No. 11-345, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-345.htm (last updated Aug. 16, 2013). 
249 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (showing that Bakke was 
argued October 12, 1977, and decided June 28, 1978); see also Docket Sheet, No. 77-1381, Drum-
mond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs. (June 19, 1978) (on file with the Library 
of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) (showing that the Drummond petition for certiorari was 
filed in March 1978, and the vote to deny certiorari was held in mid-June 1978); cf. Memorandum 
from K.E. on No. 77-1381, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., to the 
Cert Pool 13 (June 1, 1978) (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers) 
(arguing against a hold on Drummond despite the fact that Bakke was pending, because the cases 
“arise in such different factual context[s]”). 
250 Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 547 F.2d 835, 837 (5th 
Cir. 1977); Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 554-55 (S.C. 2012). 
251 Compare Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 
1204-06 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), with Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 555-56. 
252 See Drummond, 547 F.2d at 841-46; Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 567. 
253 I focus here on the legal differences between Adoptive Couple and Drummond, but there 
were important factual differences as well. Most important, in Adoptive Couple, Baby Girl’s 
biological father desired to raise her and was the party contesting the adoption. It was only 
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predominant issues presented for review in Adoptive Couple were statutory, 
not constitutional, arising under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA).254 And, to the extent that constitutional concerns might be 
implicated (as the Petitioners and the guardian ad litem suggested), it was 
far from clear that strict scrutiny—as opposed to rational basis review—
would apply.255 Because the ICWA applied by virtue of Baby Girl’s “Indian” 
status—a status the Court has traditionally treated as political, rather than 
racial—even plenary consideration of Adoptive Couple would not (unlike the 
cases that had come before) require the Court to directly take up the 
conflict with its affirmative action precedents that it had long sought to 
avoid.256 
And indeed, the outcome for the prospective adoptive parents in Adoptive 
Couple (the Capobiancos) would ultimately differ dramatically from that 
faced by the Drummonds. In January 2013, the Court would—unlike in 
Drummond—grant certiorari review in Adoptive Couple.257 Ultimately, the 
Court would interpret the ICWA to hold that state law, not the ICWA’s 
Indian-specific provisions, must control.258 As such, the Court would hold 
that no bar existed under federal law to Baby Girl’s adoption by the 
Capobiancos, a holding that would later result in the return of Baby Girl to 
the Capobianco’s custody for adoption.259 
 
because of the specifics of South Carolina state law (which did not require the consent of a 
biological father to adoption where the father was not involved during the pregnancy or immedi-
ately post-birth) that the ICWA issues became the focus of the proceedings. 
254 Compare Federal Drummond Petition, supra note 43, at 4-5, 25-27 (arguing for strict scruti-
ny to review the use of race discrimination in adoption and analogizing to then-pending Bakke), 
with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl at *ii, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) 
(No. 12-399) [hereinafter Adoptive Couple Petition] (presenting only statutory questions for 
review). But cf. Adoptive Couple Petition, supra, at 26 (suggesting that equal protection principles 
should inform the statutory analysis); Response of Guardian Ad Litem at *10-12, Adoptive Couple, 
133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399) (raising the equal protection issue prominently).  
255 See infra note 256 and accompanying text. 
256 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974) (finding that the hiring preferences 
given to Indians within the Bureau of Indian Affairs were distinct from invidious race discrimina-
tion because they were not racial preferences, but rather “employment criteri[a] reasonably 
designed to further the cause of Indian self-government”); cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 
438 U.S. 265, 304 n.42 (1978) (Powell, J.) (rejecting the view that Mancari supported the argument 
that something less than strict scrutiny should be applied on the grounds that the classification at 
issue in Mancari “was not racial at all”). 
257 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013) (granting certiorari review). 
258 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. 
259 Id.; see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 404 S.C. 490, 492-493 (2013) (holding, on remand, 
that Baby Girl must be removed from her biological father’s home and returned to her prospective 
adoptive parents for the finalization of the adoption). See generally Father Is Ending Battle for Custody, 
TULSA WORLD (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/father-is-ending-battle-for-custody/ 
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Moreover, the Court would, for the first time in Adoptive Couple seem to 
express a less than fully approving view of certain forms of heritage-based 
adoption decisionmaking. Mirroring long-time legal and social norms 
essentializing those of only partial Native American heritage as non-Indian, 
the Court would repeatedly signal its discomfort with applying the ICWA’s 
Indian preferences to someone of Baby Girl’s “remote” Native American 
ancestry.260 Characterizing the application of the ICWA’s provisions in such 
a context as a “great disadvantage,” the Court would ultimately conclude 
that the statute’s application in Adoptive Couple “would raise equal protec-
tion concerns.”261 Thus, at least with regard to those like Baby Girl—
perceived by the Court as not being truly of the heritage ascribed to her 
under the law—Adoptive Couple seemed to signal, for the first time, the 
Court’s perception of certain race-matching prescriptions as less than fully 
benign.262  
But ultimately, despite these signs of the Court’s discomfort with the 
ICWA’s potential reach, Adoptive Couple would do little to disrupt the 
existing, constitutionally permissive, race/family law regime.263 Thus, the 
 
article_125eb3a1-77db-57d5-9f4a-e71612be7502.html (detailing the timeline of the Adoptive Couple 
legal dispute).  
260 See, e.g., Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556, 2559, 2565 (repeatedly noting the precise 
quantum of Baby Girl’s blood heritage, and characterizing it as “remote”). This anxiety over an 
insufficient biological nexus to Indian status—while irrelevant as a matter of equal protection 
doctrine—tracks the historical tendency to essentialize those with relatively little Native American 
status as non-Native American, a tendency that has been precisely reversed in the context of 
African Americans. See, e.g., Kevin Noble Maillard, The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of 
American Indian Ancestry From Racial Purity Law, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351, 372 (2007); cf. 
Gregory Ablavsky, Comment, Making Indians “White”: The Judicial Abolition of Native Slavery in 
Revolutionary Virginia and its Racial Legacy, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1457, 1515-19 (2011) (describing the 
historical legal categorization of Indians as “white” and government efforts to convert Indian 
cultural practices). 
261 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. 
262 It is not clear that this specific discomfort is a signal of a broader disapproval on the 
Court of the use of race or heritage in adoption. To the extent that the key concern in Adoptive 
Couple was Baby Girl’s insufficient Native American heritage (as the majority opinion’s repeated 
allusions to her blood quantum suggest), the crux of the Court’s concern appears to have been that 
she was inaccurately race-matched, not the fact of the utilization of racial or ethnic heritage in the 
adoption process. Cf. Reisman v. Tenn. Dep’t of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356, 363-66 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1993) (finding a violation of equal protection where an agency race-matched biracial 
children with black parents, but ordering instead that “bi-racial children shall be placed in foster 
homes and in adoptive homes with bi-racial families”—i.e., that they should be even more 
specifically race matched). 
263 From a constitutional perspective, the status quo vis-à-vis remaining race-based family 
law practices remains largely unchanged today. Thus, while such cases are less frequent today (due 
in part to the changes brought about by MEPA), multiple jurisdictions continue to have non-
overruled decisions affirming the constitutionality of using race in adoption, foster care, or 
interracial custody disputes when race is not the sole factor. See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 
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majority opinion in Adoptive Couple would—despite hinting obliquely at 
potential constitutional concerns—ultimately leave all of the ICWA’s core 
provisions intact.264 Indeed, despite the sharp disagreements that Adoptive 
Couple generated among the Justices, no Justice—in the majority or the 
dissent—would suggest that the ICWA’s core heritage-based provision 
(mandating the preferential placement of Indian children with other 
Indians) must be struck down.265 
Nor would any member of the Court suggest that strict scrutiny—and 
the meaningful constitutional examination that it entails—must be applied 
 
240, 241-45 (8th Cir. 1989) (awarding qualified immunity in a case where the agency had a policy 
stating that “[m]inority children shall be placed with families of similar racial and ethnic 
characteristics”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990); Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t of Family & 
Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1204-06 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); 
Tallman v. Tabor, 859 F. Supp. 1078, 1085-88 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Child v. Stangler, No. 92-0850, 
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19954, at *7-9 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 28, 1992) (noting in dicta that relying on 
race as a factor is not improper in an adoption proceeding); In re F.W., 870 A.2d 82, 86-87 (D.C. 
2005) (affirming that race is a proper consideration in adoption determinations); In re Petition of 
D.I.S., 494 A.2d 1316, 1319-27 (D.C. 1985); Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dep’t. of Family & 
Children’s Servs., 228 S.E.2d 839, 844 (Ga. 1976) (finding that “the Drummonds ha[d] no rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment” and thus no standing to contest denial of adoption based on 
race), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905 (1977); Gambla, 853 N.E.2d 847, 868-70 (Ill. App. Div. 2006), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 810 (2007); Gloria G. v. State Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 833 P.2d 979, 984-86 
(Kan. 1992); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1042-49 (Md. 1994); In re 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 453 N.E.2d 1236, 1237, 1239 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983), aff ’d on other grounds, 461 
N.E.2d 186 (Mass. 1984); In re Carpenter, No. 21634, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 2140, at *9-11 
(Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1999); Carlson v. County of Hennepin, 428 N.W.2d 453, 455, 458 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1988) (granting qualified immunity to the adoption agency in a case where the prospec-
tive parents were informed that “it would be against county policy to allow a white couple to adopt 
a black child”), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1023 (1989); Brown v. Brown, 621 N.W.2d 70, 82-83 (Neb. 
2000); In re Haven, No. C-780343, 1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9744, at *6-16 (Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1979); 
cf. In re Moorehead, 600 N.E.2d 778, 784-89 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (invalidating, in different 
appellate district than Haven, an agency’s exclusive use of race to disqualify an adoptive family).  
Four other states have never reached the constitutional issue but have permitted uses of race 
in adoption, foster care, or interracial custody disputes as a matter of state law. See, e.g., In re 
Marriage of Mikelson, 299 N.W.2d 670 (Iowa 1980); Savage v. Cota, 885 N.Y.S.2d 798 (App. Div. 
2009); Davis v. Davis, 658 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div. 1997); In re Davis, 465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1981) 
(ambiguous whether based on constitutional analysis or state law); In re Adoption of A.S.H., 674 
A.2d 698 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (same); Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950); Tucker v. Tucker, 
542 P.2d 789 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (affirming that race can be a factor in custody disputes 
between interracial parents, albeit not the sole factor). 
264 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565 (suggesting that constitutional concerns would be 
raised by a different result). But cf. id. at 2564 (leaving intact ICWA’s statutory preference 
framework). The opinion leaves intact, inter alia, a statutory framework which prefers members of 
the child’s tribe and “other Indian families” above other competing adoptive families, finding it to 
be inapplicable based purely on the technical grounds that no competing adoption petitions had 
been filed. Id. at 2564-65. 
265 See supra note 264; see also Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(discussing § 1915’s placement preferences). 
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as the applicable constitutional standard of review. Indeed, the majority—
despite its brief allusion to equal protection—would itself apply no mean-
ingful constitutional scrutiny to the ICWA, nor otherwise signal that a 
strict scrutiny standard might be appropriate.266 And five of the Justices in 
Adoptive Couple—including race conservatives such as Justices Thomas and 
Scalia—would entirely eschew an equal protection-based rationale, electing 
instead to rely on purely statutory or unrelated constitutional rationales.267 
Thus, despite the Court’s virtually simultaneous reaffirmance of its “color-
blind” approach to affirmative action doctrine in Fisher, it would not, in 
Adoptive Couple, seek to extend that doctrine to the family law domain.268 
Therefore, Adoptive Couple—far from staging a revolutionary incursion 
into the lower courts’ permissive approach to the use of race in family law—
would instead continue the Court’s long-standing hands-off approach. Three 
and a half decades after Drummond and Bakke, the Court would again elect 
to leave the affirmative action–family law divide essentially undisturbed.269 
Although much had arguably changed since Drummond—with the Court’s 
colorblindness “revolution” unfolding across a series of landmark cases—the 
Court’s constitutional approach to family law would change little; continu-
ing as ever it had before.  
 
266 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565 (alluding briefly to potential “equal protection 
concerns” but without applying strict scrutiny to the ICWA’s provisions or otherwise suggesting 
that strict scrutiny would be the appropriate standard of review). 
267 Id. at 2570 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2584-85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (joined 
in relevant part by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Scalia). The dissenters addressed the equal 
protection issue, but concluded that no equal protection concern existed, given that classifications 
based on Indian tribal membership have traditionally been treated as non-racial. See id. at 2584-85 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
268 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (holding that any racial 
classification, including those that “may seem benign,” must be subject to strict scrutiny). I do not 
mean to suggest here that it was erroneous for the dissenters in Adoptive Couple to treat the ICWA 
context as distinctive due to the Court’s historical treatment of Indian status as a political, rather 
than racial, status. Rather, the point here is that to the extent the Court viewed the classifications 
at issue in Adoptive Couple as racial, rather than political, it entirely declined to apply the 
framework that it has otherwise deemed applicable in the affirmative action context. For further 
elaboration of this point, see infra note 276. 
269 There are many possible factors that complicate any attempt to understand Adoptive 
Couple simplistically, including the different cultural and legal salience that has traditionally 
attached to Indian status. Cf. supra note 260. Thus, although it is undoubtedly accurate that the 
Court did not elect to use the case as a basis for eliminating (or even meaningfully narrowing) the 
affirmative action–family law divide, it is certainly plausible that a much more complicated set of 
considerations may have been at work in Adoptive Couple than in some of the other cases in which 
the Court has declined to intervene entirely. Unfortunately, access to the Justices’ papers (which 
might allow a fuller understanding of the internal dynamics in Adoptive Couple) will likely not be 
available for a very long time.  
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 VI. IMPLICATIONS 
There are two very different stories to be told of the history of the 
Court’s constitutional race law jurisprudence. The first—told by the Court 
itself in its affirmative action opinions—is one in which context has mattered 
little.270 Under this account, what has mattered to the Court is not any 
contextual factor—such as whether a particular racial classification may be 
categorized as putatively benign—but instead simply the use of race itself. 
Government uses of race are simply too categorically divisive, too inherently 
problematic, to be exempted from strict scrutiny review on any grounds. 
Instead, equal protection has demanded (and continues to demand) that the 
Court strive toward colorblindness and cabin uses of race to the narrowest 
of circumstances; only where they may be characterized as “narrowly 
tailored” to meet a “compelling state interest.” This account, then, is one in 
which consistency—across all of race law’s many domains—is treated as 
doctrinally demanded of the Court and held out as empirically true.  
But a very different story is told by the history of the Court’s involve-
ment in contemporary race-based family law practices.271 Here, many of the 
same Justices who have rejected contextual variability in the affirmative 
action context have taken the opposite approach: they have embraced 
variable standards and rejected consistency as the rubric that the constitu-
tion demands. Thus, many of the same Justices who have formed the Court’s 
majority on affirmative action—far from demanding the uniform application 
of strict scrutiny in the family law context—have consistently avoided the 
application of strict scrutiny to contemporary race-based family law practic-
es. And these actions, it seems, have been based precisely on the types of 
normatively based considerations that the Court’s race conservatives have, 
in the affirmative action context, decried. 
Some might resist this account, so far from the Court’s own. But it is 
difficult to read the historical record otherwise. Thus, Palmore v. Sidoti—
long conceptualized by scholars in terms consistent with the Court’s own 
account—is cast in a far different light by the archival records available 
today. Despite its contemporary canonical status, Palmore was not a case the 
Court’s race conservatives wanted to take up.272 And, when the Court’s 
liberal wing (joined by Justice Stevens) nevertheless voted to do so, the 
Court’s race conservatives successfully advocated to limit its reach, based 
precisely on the perception that the remaining uses of race in family law 
 
270 For further discussion and sources, see generally supra Introduction and Part III. 
271 For further discussion and sources, see generally supra Sections I–V. 
272 See supra notes 100-01 and supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
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were fundamentally “different” and benign.273 Thus, the lower courts’ 
response to Palmore—as of marginal significance outside of its specific 
context—appears to be exactly that intended by the Court’s race conserva-
tives and race moderates, rather than an aberrational or willful misread-
ing.274 
Nor did the Court embrace the much more recent opportunity afforded 
to it to bring its affirmative action and family law jurisprudence into 
alignment.275 Although the race discrimination issue was strongly argued by 
both the petitioners and guardian ad litem in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
the Court itself restricted its equal protection analysis to a single ambiguous 
sentence.276 Moreover, two of the Court’s leading race conservatives—
Justices Scalia and Thomas—declined to endorse even this soft statement, 
eschewing any form of equal protection-based rationale.277 Thus, despite the 
strength of the rhetoric that the Court’s race conservatives have deployed in 
arguing for the inherent invidiousness of any race-based practices, their 
actions in the family law context reflect a far different approach. 
And although the Court’s reticence in Adoptive Couple might be explained 
by its particular context (involving primarily statutory issues and arising in 
the Indian law context), context cannot similarly explain the entirety of the 
Court’s decades-long silence on the lower courts’ loose and permissive 
approach to race in the family. Since the mid-1970s, litigants have repeatedly—
in cases squarely presenting the issue—urged the Court to take up and 
address its family law–affirmative action divide. In every single one of those 
cases, the court below declined to apply strict scrutiny review. And in every 
 
273 See supra notes 133-42 and supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. 
274 Compare supra note 273, with supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text. See generally supra 
Sections II-III. 
275 See generally supra notes 263-69 and accompanying text. 
276 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013); see also Brief for Petitioners at 
44-47, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399); Brief for Guardian ad Litem at 53-55, Adoptive 
Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399). Even in this single sentence, the Court did not explicitly state 
that it viewed the ICWA as entailing a race-based classification, although it implied as much. 
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. I do not mean to suggest here that the Court should have 
viewed the ICWA’s provisions as involving a racial, rather than political, designation for equal 
protection purposes. Cf. id. at 2584-85 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (contending that the ICWA’s 
classifications should be considered nonracial under the Court’s precedents). I simply observe 
that—to the extent the majority viewed the issue as a racial one—they failed to apply the 
constitutional framework that the Court reaffirmed as a categorical imperative just the previous 
day. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417-19 (2013) (reiterating that “[a]ny 
racial classification must meet strict scrutiny” and that racial classifications are inherently “odious” 
and “inherently suspect” (citations omitted)).  
277 Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2570 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2585 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); id. at 257-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that he joined Justice Sotomayor’s dissent 
“except as to one detail” of her statutory reasoning unrelated to the equal protection analysis).  
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one of those cases, the litigant challenging the use of race lost below. Yet, in 
every case for which we have internal records, including Palmore, each of the 
Court’s race conservatives uniformly voted against certiorari review.278 In 
contrast, the vast majority of the Court’s race liberals and race moderates 
have cast votes in favor of certiorari review.279 
Nor is it plausible to ascribe this uniform pattern simply to the vagaries 
of certiorari review. To be sure, the Court turns down many cases for 
reasons that are wholly unrelated to their merits.280 But the cases that have 
reached the Court have included a vast array of compelling circumstances: 
cases in which the court below found race to be the sole cause, cases in 
which there was a categorical policy of placing minority children with 
minority families, cases in which no Justice disputed that race was disposi-
tive.281 Under these circumstances, it is difficult—if not impossible—to 
 
278  Docket Sheet, No. 92-616, Sharp v. Hennepin County (on file with the Library of Con-
gress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 90-123, Wilson v. Darrow (on file with the 
Blackmun Digital Archive); Docket Sheet, No. 89-906, J.H.H. v. O’Hara (on file with the Library 
of Congress, Thurgood Marshall Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 88-6265, Carlson v. County of 
Hennepin (on file with the Blackmun Digital Archive); Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. 
Sidoti (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
Papers); Docket Sheet #2, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington and Lee 
University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 82-1734, Palmore v. 
Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 
82-1734, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun Papers); 
Docket Sheet, No. 76-984, Drummond v. Fulton Cnty. Dept. of Family & Children’s Servs. (on 
file with the Library of Congress, Byron R. White Papers); Docket Sheet, No. 77-1381, Drummond 
v. Fulton County Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs. (on file with the Library of Congress, Harry 
A. Blackmun Papers); see also Docket Sheet, A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti (on file with the Washington 
and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) (Palmore stay proceedings); 
Memorandum of Thurgood Marshall on No. A-664, Palmore v. Sidoti, to the Conference (Mar. 3, 
1983) (on file with the Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers) 
(Palmore stay proceedings). 
279 See supra note 278. 
280 Compare Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 296 (1989) (explaining that because of the range 
of considerations that can lead to a denial of certiorari review, such denials do not have the same 
effect as a decision on the merits), with McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3094 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (ascribing substantive legal meaning to the Court’s pattern of certiorari 
denials despite recognizing their lack of precedential weight). 
281 See, e.g., J.H.H. v. O’Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 243-45 (8th Cir. 1989) (dismissing a lawsuit 
challenging a race-based foster care decision made pursuant to a policy requiring placement of 
minority children with families of “similar racial and ethnic characteristics”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
851 (1990); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 2633, 646 A.2d 1036, 1048-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1994) (acknowledging that race was the sole consideration in an agency’s foster care/adoption 
determination, but nevertheless upholding the placement decision), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 809 
(1995); see also supra note 130 (documenting that all Justices appear to have agreed in Palmore that 
race was the dispositive or at least predominant factor in the lower court’s decision). 
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conclude that the Court has simply been unable to find an appropriate 
vehicle for review.282 
Thus, it appears that the Court’s absence from contemporary debates 
over the use of race in family law has been far from the product of mere 
oversight. Family law has been conceived of as simply too “different”—the 
use of race there too “natural” and benign—to warrant the type of interven-
tion that has historically been demanded in the affirmative action context. 
Instead, the Court has self-consciously—but sub silentio—endorsed the 
lower courts’ loose and permissive approach to race in family law, an 
approach that has predictably allowed all but the most extreme contempo-
rary instantiations of race-based family law decisionmaking to endure. 
This approach to family law stands in stark contrast to the doctrinal jus-
tifications that the Court has offered in support of its affirmative action 
regime.283 Thus, the Court’s approach to affirmative action—demanding 
uniform strict scrutiny, with predictably harsh results—has been justified 
precisely by reference to the impermissibility of a contextually or normatively 
 
282 Another alternative explanation—that the Court has avoided such cases because they 
involve family law, rather than race-based family law per se—is neither persuasive nor relevant, 
even if true. To be sure, the Court has long exceptionalized family law as a bastion of state control 
in which the federal courts have little business intervening. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism 
and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1297-1310 (1998). But with the exception of 
certain narrow doctrinal contexts, all inapplicable here (such as the domestic relations to diversity 
jurisdiction), the Court has, in fact, felt free to intervene regularly in family law disputes. See, e.g., 
David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 529 (2008) (observing 
that the Court’s decisions have “fundamentally redefined” American family law, refocusing its 
central discourse on rights in a way unimaginable under the old regime (quoting Michael 
Grossberg, How to Give the Present a Past? Family Law in the United States, 1950–2000, in CROSS 
CURRENTS: FAMILY LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 3 (Sanford 
Katz et al. eds., 2000))); see also Hasday, supra (challenging, persuasively, the Court’s rhetorical 
characterization of family law as a bastion of state control, outside the Court’s and the federal 
government’s bailiwick); HASDAY, supra note 16, at 28-68 (same).  
Moreover, even if the Court’s reluctance to scrutinize continued uses of race in family law has 
derived in part from a generalized reluctance to scrutinize family law issues, such a contextually 
based resistance to applying strict scrutiny is nevertheless clearly inconsistent with the Court’s 
articulated categorical approach. See supra notes 175-83 (chronicling the Court’s justifications for its 
doctrinal approach to affirmative action, based precisely on rhetorical and normative claims that 
context does not and cannot matter in determining the level of scrutiny applied to government 
uses of race). The Court has sanctioned a regime in which all uses of race, regardless of context, 
must be subjected to the most rigid form of review because of their inherent harms. It is just as 
inconsistent for the Court to decline to compel the application of strict scrutiny to an area because 
it is one in which it wishes to reduce its institutional profile as it is for the Court to do so because 
of any of the other contextually based considerations that might cause the Court to desire to 
permit greater flexibility in race-based state decisionmaking. Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 564-68 (1995) (articulating federalism-based concerns about federal intervention in both 
education (the primary locus of affirmative action decisions) and family law). 
283 For further discussion and sources, see generally supra Introduction and Part III. 
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variable approach. It is impossible to take context into account, we are told, 
precisely because the use of race by government is—in every context—so 
inherently dangerous and malign. Thus the Court’s aggressive intervention 
is not only permissible, but essential, lest the perils of racial decision-
making infuse our constitutional polity with their inevitable divisiveness 
and stigmatic harms. In short, the formal doctrinal position articulated by 
the Court in its affirmative action precedents has presumed harm to flow 
from all government uses of race, leaving no room for the type of contextual 
variability it has in fact allowed.284 
This divergence between the Court’s formal race law doctrine and its 
actual approach creates profound process, legitimacy, and substantive 
concerns. Because the Court has explicitly articulated a particular doctrinal 
rule—that no deviations are permitted from strict scrutiny’s inexorable 
command—while sub silentio following a different approach, it has deprived 
litigants and the public of the ability to fully participate in one of the most 
important debates in contemporary American constitutionalism (i.e., which 
contemporary uses of race should be permitted to endure).285 Moreover, the 
Court’s current approach—unguided by fixed legal standards, and conducted 
out of sight of any public scrutiny—of necessity puts the Justices in the 
position of picking and choosing which uses of race to favor based on no 
more than their own normative intuitions. Such a regime cannot, in the 
 
284 Shorn of this absolutist justification, it is difficult to see what props up the contemporary 
affirmative action regime. That is, if the Court does, in fact, deploy a contextually variable 
approach to deciding whether to apply strict scrutiny, it is not at all clear why affirmative action, 
but not, for example, family law or race-based suspect selection, should fall on the strict scrutiny 
side of the divide. Indeed, precisely because the Court has relied so extensively on the assumption 
that strict scrutiny is categorical, it has done little work to truly substantiate affirmative action’s 
purported harms.  
285 To be sure, litigants have been able to participate at the margins of this debate. But in a 
regime where the Court has formally denied that context matters to whether or not strict scrutiny 
applies, litigants are largely excluded from the Court’s decisions as to which context-based factors 
will, in fact, be deployed. This dynamic is rendered even more problematic by the fact that the 
strict scrutiny framework itself, as the Court has construed it, allows de minimis real evaluation of 
a racial practice’s harms or benefits and thus does not offer an alternative mechanism for this type 
of evidence or argumentation to be introduced. For example, strict scrutiny does not encompass 
any real world evaluation of the harms or lack of harms of a particular racial practice, and instead 
presumes such harms. And while benefits of a practice may be considered as part of the “compel-
ling state interest” analysis, the Court has so significantly narrowed what may be considered a 
compelling interest that most of the factors that one might want to consider in assessing whether a 
particular racial classification is normatively justified are legally irrelevant. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 
517 U.S. 899, 909-10 (1996) (“[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimination is not a 
compelling state interest.”); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1985) (finding that the 
desire to provide role models is not a compelling state interest); see also Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013) (characterizing Bakke as having held that “[r]edressing past 
discrimination could not serve as a compelling interest” in the university context). 
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long term, be sustained without fundamental damage to the Court’s legiti-
macy as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional race law doctrine.286  
As importantly, such a regime seems likely to inexorably lead to distor-
tions in the further development of constitutional race law jurisprudence. 
Explicitly disclaiming the salience of contextual and normative factors while 
in fact attending to them sub rosa predictably leads to doctrinal confusion 
and inconsistency. Indeed, arguably a number of the most incoherent and 
logically tortured features of both the Supreme Court’s and the lower 
courts’ constitutional race law jurisprudence have derived from the attempt 
to fit preferred racial practices (including, but not limited to, family law) 
within the Court’s contextually unvarying race law framework.287 Thus, the 
divergence between doctrine and practice seems likely to lead only to the 
further fragmentation and intellectual disintegration of race law doctrine, 
stripping it of even the limited veneer of fairness that it derives from its 
putative mandate of consistency today.  
Perhaps, then, prior family law litigants have been right: what is needed 
is for the Court to take up and address contemporary uses of race in family 
law and to bring them under the strict scrutiny rubric. Indeed, if family law 
stood alone, such an approach might—despite the long historical record—
seem the most plausible approach. There can be no doubt that the Court 
has, if anything, turned further toward constitutional colorblindness in 
recent years, nor that many of its Justices have a deeply felt normative 
commitment to eradicating at least certain uses of race from contemporary 
public life. And Adoptive Couple signals that, although the Court has so far 
been unwilling to extend its doctrine, there may indeed be instances of race-
based family law decisionmaking that at least some of its Justices perceive as 
 
286 Whatever the merits or drawbacks of the Court’s claimed approach to race in the law, it 
has the veneer of adherence to the rule of law, of an evenhanded and neutral decisionmaking 
principle. Absent such a veneer, the Court’s actions begin to look troublingly like race politics. For 
all the reasons that the Court’s race moderates have emphasized, such appearances—whatever the 
reality—matter. See generally Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 12. Indeed, few would dispute 
that it is deeply divisive for the Court to be perceived as a naked power player in the continuing 
debates over the proper role of race in American society. Cf. Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection, 
supra note 5, at 1120 (making a similar point in the context of discussing the problems with treating 
race-based suspect selection as constitutionally exceptional). 
287 See supra Parts I–V; see also Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection, supra note 5, at 1108-25 
(discussing race-based suspect selection); Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 12, at 1361 (same); cf. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (holding that in the disfavored context of affirmative 
action, only the use of race as a factor is required to trigger strict scrutiny); Miller v. Johnson, 515 
U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (finding that in the favored context of redistricting, the plaintiff must show 
that race was the “predominant factor” to trigger strict scrutiny).  
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malign.288 Thus, it is plausible that, were the Court faced with the need to 
align its family law and affirmative action doctrines, affirmative action’s 
putatively categorical approach would endure. 
But family law does not stand alone in its current exemption from the 
Court’s putatively categorical colorblindness revolution. As scholars such as 
Rick Banks and Reva Siegel have observed, family law is only one of a 
number of areas—including race-based suspect selection, nonclassifying 
(but race-intentional) efforts to promote integration, and other non-
individualized efforts to promote substantive equality—in which the lower 
courts have consistently declined to apply strict scrutiny review, and in 
which the Supreme Court has consistently declined to intervene. Indeed, 
despite affirmative action law’s ostensibly categorical command, there are 
relatively few areas to which the Court has formally extended its reach.289 
Thus, there remain today many areas in which governments (state, local, 
and federal) continue to make open and pervasive use of race, as to which 
the Court has traditionally declined to apply strict scrutiny review. 
There are strong reasons to believe that the Court is—at least at present—
unprepared to dramatically reshape this very partial regime. Thus, although 
there have been hints across a number of domains that the Court has begun 
to problematize racial practices that have long remained effectively unscruti-
nized, it has so far shown itself far from willing to fully embrace the impli-
cations of a truly colorblind race law regime.290 Indeed, several of the 
 
288 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (characterizing the applica-
tion of the ICWA as a disadvantage, rather than a benefit, at least where the child at issue has only 
“remote” Native American heritage). 
289 See supra note 5. Even in the few contexts where the Court has ostensibly extended its 
affirmative action precedents, it has often in fact applied different gatekeeping standards and 
declined to apply strict scrutiny across the board to all uses of race. Compare Miller, 515 U.S. at 917, 
920 (holding that strict scrutiny applies to race-based redistricting, but demanding a showing that 
race was the “predominant factor” in order to trigger review), with Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (stating 
that race need only be a factor in order to trigger strict scrutiny review). See also Ian Haney-
López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1868-71 (2012) (discussing the extension of 
the colorblindness doctrine to redistricting, and characterizing the Court’s contortions to avoid 
broadly invalidating uses of race in the redistricting context as “comedic”). 
290 Most notably, the longstanding characterization of government actions that are race tar-
geted but do not individually classify based on race as “race-neutral” has been increasingly 
problematized by the Court. (This includes, for example, programs like Texas’s Ten Percent Plan, 
race-based school districting to promote integration, and the myriad of other government 
programs that seek to promote substantive equality goals without formally racially classifying.) 
See, e.g., Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Only an ostrich could re-
gard . . . supposedly neutral alternatives [to affirmative action, such as Texas’s Ten Percent Plan] as 
race unconscious”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (PICS), 551 U.S. 701, 
745 (2007) (plurality opinion) (declining to express any opinion “even in dicta” on the constitu-
tional validity of race-intentional government actions); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340 (questioning 
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Justices key to any such doctrinal revolution—including Justices Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Scalia—have, in ways explicit and implicit, signaled strongly 
their unwillingness to make such a move.291  
And yet such nonstrict scrutiny uses of race are becoming increasingly 
difficult for the Court to simply avoid. As colorblindness’s inexorable 
command has seeped its way deep into legal doctrine and the public con-
sciousness, conservative litigation groups—and the lower courts—have 
increasingly questioned exemptions that historically have been taken as 
obvious and benign.292 As they do so, the Court will find itself increasingly 
 
whether ten percent plans like Texas’s can properly be characterized as “race-neutral”); see also 
Siegel, Antibalkanization, supra note 12, at 1283 (making a similar observation regarding the 
increasing problematization of these practices); cf. Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 
343, 349 (5th Cir. 2011) (questioning, in the aftermath of PICS, whether “benign” race-intentional 
school redistricting can be exempted from strict scrutiny). But see infra note 291 (discussing the 
open resistance of several key race conservatives to truly reading the Court’s affirmative action 
precedents as globally requiring strict scrutiny). 
291 See, e.g., PICS, 551 U.S. at 787-89, 796-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing the nor-
mative view that school districts should be able to make use of devices that are intended to 
increase racial integration but which do not individually classify based on race (such as strategic 
school site selection, redrawing of attendance zones, etc.), and expressing the view that such 
approaches should not trigger strict scrutiny); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 541 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J. dissenting) (rejecting, strenuously, the argument that the Court’s 
affirmative action precedents in fact demand the application of strict scrutiny to all uses of race 
and contending instead that those precedents address only the narrow issue of whether “classifica-
tions favoring rather than disfavoring blacks are exempt” from strict scrutiny); Siegel, Antibalkani-
zation, supra note 12, at 1308 (noting the significance of Justice Kennedy’s position in PICS); see also 
supra note 277 and accompanying text (noting that in Adoptive Couple, Justices Scalia and Thomas 
declined to join even the majority’s very soft intimation that the use of racial heritage in adoption 
might trigger equal protection concerns). 
292 For example, the conservative litigation group Pacific Legal Foundation has increasingly 
called upon the Court to apply strict scrutiny to uses of race that have intended racially ameliora-
tive effects but do not classify racially, a category of race-based practices that the lower courts have 
traditionally exempted from strict scrutiny review. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal 
Foundation & Center for Equal Opportunity in Support of Neither Party, Township of Mount 
Holly, NJ v. Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 636 (2013) (No. 11-1507); Brief 
for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Student Doe 1 v. Lower 
Merion Sch. Dist., 132 S. Ct. 2773 (2012) (No. 11-35); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation & Center 
for Equal Opportunity as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, City of New Haven v. Briscoe, 132 
S. Ct. 2741 (2012) (No. 11-1024); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012) (No. 10-1032); Brief of Pacific 
Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 
205 (2010) (No. 08-974); Brief for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Oakley v. City of Memphis, Tennessee, 557 U.S. 930 (2009) (No. 08-744); Brief for 
Pacific Legal Foundation et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bartlett v. Strickland, 
556 U.S. 1 (2009) (No. 07-689).  
The lower courts have also in recent years begun to display increased receptiveness to these 
types of arguments. See, e.g., Lewis v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 662 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2011); 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 242 n.156 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds 133 S. 
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faced with a regime in which simply ignoring continued uses of race—and 
allowing the lower courts to continue to refuse strict scrutiny review—will 
prove an untenable approach. Thus, we may well be poised at a juncture 
where the way is uniquely open—and the stakes uniquely high—for a 
reassessment of the extent to which context should—and does—matter to 
our constitutional race law jurisprudence.  
Such a development—whatever its substantive outcomes—would be an 
improvement. In an area as divisive and charged as race, it can only breed 
cynicism and disrespect for the Court to hold out as the fundamental 
justification for its actions normative and empirical claims that are not true. 
Nor can such an approach hope to achieve real progress in solving the 
genuine problems posed by race in our society. In short, without an honest 
starting point, we cannot hope to have meaningful conversations about the 
contemporary constitutional significance of race. 
CONCLUSION 
As Jed Rubenfeld has observed, it is sometimes only by looking across 
the sweep of the law that we can understand the Court’s true doctrinal and 
normative commitments.293 The contemporary history of race in family law 
bears this out and demonstrates that even within the relatively narrow span 
of equal protection doctrine, a nonholistic view can obscure key insights. 
Thus, it is only by looking across the spread of equal protection doctrine—
and particularly at the Court’s complex role in the history of contemporary 
race family doctrine—that the very partial nature of the Court’s commit-
ment to its colorblindness regime emerges. 
This partiality has, or should have, fundamental implications for the 
Court’s race law doctrine. If certain favored uses of race in the law do in fact 
exist, such uses should be decided not in accordance with the Justices’ 
intuitive and personal views, but instead based on some systematic and 
transparent means of adjudication. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more 
 
Ct. 2411 (2013); Antonelli v. New Jersey, 419 F.3d 267, 273-74 (3d Cir. 2005); cf. Balkin & Siegel, 
Principles, supra note 5, at 930-33, 937-43 (describing the process through which consensus can shift 
as to the applicability of a legal principle, and looking at the example of the collection of racial 
data and whether it fits within the antidiscrimination principle). 
293 Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1144 (2002) (argu-
ing that “[a] line of cases can seem perfectly intelligible when evaluated in its own doctrinal 
compartment, yet its intelligibility can evaporate altogether when placed side by side with another 
line of cases,” and suggesting that applying such an approach to a number of “the Court’s most 
important new pronouncements in constitutional law” demonstrates that such cases “cannot be 
taken seriously in their own doctrinal terms, but are better understood as part of an anti-
antidiscrimination agenda”). 
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complete abrogation of the rule of law than the Court’s current approach to 
determining which instantiations of racial decisionmaking receive favored 
treatment: decisions made in secret, in complete contradiction of the 
Court’s formally articulated legal rule, and without litigant or other stake-
holder input.294 It is time to bring such concerns out in the open and have a 
real conversation about which government uses of race should survive. 
But how would family law fare under such an explicit regime? Critics 
claim that contemporary uses of race in family law rest on racial stereotypes 
and have harmed minority and biracial children by privileging race over all 
other best interest concerns.295 And such critics have observed that there are 
many facial similarities between contemporary race-based practices in 
family law and Jim Crow–era practices.296 But others have long contended 
that such practices address very real concerns arising from the identity 
challenges that minority and biracial children face, and that these practices 
are necessary to counteract institutional biases against African American 
caregivers.297 And such practices have long had many minority proponents, 
 
294 Cf. Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60 ADMIN L. REV. 
647, 654-55 (2008) (describing the consensus elements of the rule of law). 
295 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 403-46 (arguing that race matching harms black and 
biracial children by depriving them of potential adoptive and foster care homes, as well as causing 
a host of other related harms); Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1201-26 (suggesting that race-matching 
policies that aim to place children with adoptive parents of the same race tend to result in a 
disproportionate delay in or denial of permanent placement for such children); Kim Forde-
Mazrui, Black Identity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 925, 966-67 (1994) (observing that an excessive emphasis on race by courts and 
placement agencies can cause serious harm to black children awaiting adoption). 
296 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 3-12, 367-73 (describing the historical roots of race-
matching during the Jim Crow era); Bartholet, supra note 11, at 1175-78 (noting that “near-absolute 
barriers to transracial adoption” reflected societal segregation and persisted until at least the end of 
the 1950s); cf. Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755, 755-56 (Wash. 1950) (suggesting that, in the context of a 
custody dispute, children’s best interests could be best achieved when “brought up among their 
own people”). See generally Grossman, supra note 22, at 333-35 (describing problems and questions 
posed by interracial adoption in the South in light of its history of hostility toward “interracial 
social activity”).  
297 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, The Child’s Best Interests: A Neglected Perspective on Interracial 
Intimacies, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2129, 2141-67 (2004) (book review) (arguing that the best interests 
of the child should be prioritized, and that such an approach may, in many circumstances, conflict 
with a colorblind approach to family law); Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Race Matters in Adoption, 42 
FAM. L.Q. 465, 465-69 (2008) (suggesting the “harsh truth” that “African-American children are 
not well served” when race is not considered); Nat’l Ass’n of Black Soc. Workers, Preserving 
Families of African Ancestry, http://www.nabsw.org/MServer/PreservingFamilies.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 24, 2014) (promoting the preservation of families of African ancestry by finding “culturally 
grounded options” for African American children before considering placing such children 
“outside of the community”). 
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although minority communities are by no means monolithic in their 
endorsement of contemporary race family law doctrine.298 
In short, contemporary uses of race in family law lead to no easy answers. 
But it is time for the constitutional conversation to begin. 
 
 
298 See, e.g., Preserving Families of African Ancestry, supra note 297; see also Bartholet, supra note 
199, at 2352-53 (noting the divided opinions in both black and white communities about the 
practice of race-matching in adoption). 
